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The Million-Dollar Diversity Docket
Steven Gensler* and Roger Michalski†
Congress has always imposed an amount in controversy
requirement for general diversity jurisdiction. Congress initially
set the jurisdictional amount at $500 in 1789 and has raised it six
times, most recently in 1996 to its current $75,000 threshold.
That requirement has been described as ensuring that the federal
courts not become bogged down by “petty” or “insubstantial”
state-law cases.
Given that it has been twenty-five years since the last
increase, we are probably overdue for another one. But to what
amount? For what purpose? And with what effects on the size and
composition of the diversity docket? What would happen if
Congress raised the jurisdictional amount from the current
$75,000 to, say $250,000? How many cases would that eliminate,
and which ones? Would it affect some types of cases, or some types
of litigants, more than others? And what if Congress took a much
bolder step and raised the jurisdiction amount to $500,000 or even
$1 million?
Using a novel hand-coded data set of pleadings in 2,900 cases,
we predict the likely effect of increases to the jurisdictional amount
at three levels: $250,000, $500,000, and $1 million. Our analysis
shows that, while increases do (as they must) result in fewer
diversity cases, the decline is neither extreme nor linear, with
more than half of the current docket remaining even with an
increase to $1 million. Our analysis also shows that
the jurisdictional amount is not a neutral throttle. Instead,
different areas of law, different parts of the country, and different
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litigants are more affected by changes in the jurisdictional amount
than others.
Our findings provide new guidance for Congress to consult
when evaluating proposed changes to the amount threshold.
Informed by how increases to the jurisdictional amount affect both
the size and composition of the diversity docket, Congress can
determine whether proposed increases achieve legislative goals
and serve or disserve jurisdictional policy. For scholars, our
empirical work provides a new lens into the ongoing debates about
the basic functions and functioning of the federal diversity docket.
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INTRODUCTION
Every year, litigants file around 100,000 new cases in federal
court that invoke diversity jurisdiction.1 That number could be
much higher or much lower depending on what amount, if any,
Congress sets as an amount in controversy requirement.
Article III authorizes diversity jurisdiction over any case in
which any plaintiff is diverse from any defendant (minimal
diversity).2 But the Article III judicial power is not self-executing;
rather, Congress must confer it by statute.3 Whether to confer it, and
with what limits or conditions, is up to Congress.4 Congress could
confer none of it, all of it, or any portion or amount in between.
Congress has never conferred all of the potential Article III
diversity jurisdiction. Not by a long shot. In large part, that is
because Congress has always limited the grant of general diversity
jurisdiction to cases that exceed a specified amount in controversy.5
Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has used a
jurisdictional amount requirement to regulate access to federal

1. UNITED STATES COURTS, STATISTICS & REPORTS: FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD
STATISTICS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/federal-judicialcaseload-statistics (“Filings of cases [in 2020] involving diversity of citizenship . . . rose 49
percent to 140,812.”).
2. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967) (“Article III poses
no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long
as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens.”) (emphasis added). Congress has used this
“minimal diversity” power to enact the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, the
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1369, and the Class Action Fairness
Act’s amendments to the general diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
3. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1187–88 (2010) (“The Constitution
provides that the ‘judicial Power shall extend’ to ‘Controversies . . . between Citizens of
different States.’ This language, however, does not automatically confer diversity jurisdiction
upon the federal courts. Rather, it authorizes Congress to do so and, in doing so, to determine
the scope of the federal courts’ jurisdiction within constitutional limits.”).
4. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 441 (1850); Turner v. Bank of America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799).
5. The other major constraint on the diversity docket is the requirement that all
plaintiffs be diverse from all defendants (complete diversity). See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7
U.S. 267 (1806). Unlike the amount in controversy requirement, the complete diversity
requirement is not an explicit textual requirement, nor is it the only way to read the operative
language. But that is the way the Supreme Court has read it for over two centuries. Any
change will likely have to come from Congress. Cf. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185,
197 (1990) (emphasizing that changes to federal jurisdiction are matters of policy properly
made by Congress rather than the Court).
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courts and throttle the number of diversity cases.6 First set at $500,
it now stands at $75,000. Along the way, Congress has increased the
jurisdictional amount six times (1802, 1887, 1911, 1958, 1989, and
1996) and lowered it once (1801).7 It is difficult to overstate the
significance of the amount in controversy requirement as a tool for
Congress to regulate the diversity docket. Congress could omit it
entirely, theoretically opening up the federal courts to untold
numbers of penny actions between citizens of different states. Or
Congress could all but eliminate the diversity docket by upping the
amount threshold into the trillions.
Congress has always trod a middle path, using the amount in
controversy as a tool to strike a practical balance that affords access
to federal court for many diverse-citizen cases but not all of them.
As described in the legislative record accompanying the 1958
increase from $3,000 to $10,000, the goal is to set the amount so that
it is “not so high as to convert the Federal courts into courts of big
business nor so low as to fritter away their time in the trial of
petty controversies.”8
With this challenge in mind, commentators and legislators
periodically propose modifying the amount in controversy. Given
that it has been almost 25 years since the last increase, we are
probably overdue for another one.9 But to what amount? And with
what effect? What would happen if Congress raised the
jurisdictional amount from the current $75,000 to $250,000 or, say,
$1 million? How many cases would be eliminated from the
6. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (“To ensure
that diversity jurisdiction does not flood the federal courts with minor disputes, § 1332(a)
requires that the matter in controversy in a diversity case exceed a specified amount,
currently $75,000.”). General diversity jurisdiction is not unique in this sense. Class-action
jurisdiction under CAFA and statutory interpleader represent two other types of citizenshipbased jurisdiction subject to an amount in controversy requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)
($5 million aggregate amount in controversy requirement for diversity-based jurisdiction in
class actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1335 ($500 amount in controversy requirement). For over 100 years,
the general federal question statute also included an amount in controversy requirement,
though Congress abolished it in 1980. See 13D WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3561.1, 172 (2008) (providing a history of the amount in controversy
requirement for federal questions jurisdiction).
7. See infra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
8. S. Rep. No. 1830, at 4 (1958).
9. See, e.g., Jon O. Newman, The Current Challenge of Federal Court Reform, 108 CAL. L.
REV. 905, 913 (2020) (“I would raise the jurisdictional dollar amount substantially. Isn’t it
somewhat odd that federal district courts hear diversity cases involving $75,000, but the
Texas state courts decided the dispute between Pennzoil and Texaco involving $11 billion?”).
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diversity docket? And would certain types of cases, or certain types
of litigants, be disproportionately affected?
This Article seeks to assist legislators and scholars in thinking
through these questions. Part 1 provides doctrinal and historical
background on the amount in controversy requirement. It traces
the evolution of the amount in controversy requirement from the
founding to today, highlighting the different reasons Congress has
given over the years for making increases.
Part 2 introduces our data and approach. To inquire what
would happen if Congress raised the amount in controversy, we
ask how current diversity jurisdiction cases would fare under a
raised amount in controversy standard. Our findings are based on
a time-consuming data collection effort of pleadings in 2900 cases.
We primarily utilize two methods to analyze our data: modified
Kaplan-Meier survival functions and Cox Proportional Hazard
Regression models. Both of these methods originate in the vast
literature on survival methods and estimators. Our methodological
contribution in this part is to re-conceptualize the use of survival
methods. Instead of asking on which day a machine fails, we ask at
which jurisdictional amount a case fails. We collected survival data
at three amount thresholds: $250,000, $500,000, and $1 million.
Part 3 presents our main findings. We begin by examining the
expected reduction in the overall number of diversity cases.
Increasing the amount in controversy could create a significant but
non-linear decrease in the overall size of the diversity docket.
Roughly tripling the amount to $250,000 would likely eliminate
about 20% of the diversity docket. Larger increases would have
declining marginal effects. Even if the amount threshold were
raised to $1 million (over thirteen times the current amount), well
over half of the current diversity docket would survive. At least
based on the median case, the diversity docket is already a “milliondollar diversity docket.”
We then examine whether these putative increases would affect
different components of the diversity docket differently.
Jurisdictional amounts are not neutral throttles. They do not
modulate all cases evenhandedly. A change in the required amount
in controversy would have a disparate impact across the country,
with some districts being affected roughly twice as much as
others. And increasing the amount in controversy would
disproportionately impact removed cases, cases that eventually are
1657
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transferred to MDL proceedings, and cases with pro se litigants.
Thus, setting the amount in controversy at any level entails
normative choices about which cases to bless and curse with a
federal forum and which to shun.
Part 4 sketches out some of the implications of these findings.
Congress historically has used the amount in controversy
requirement to modulate the size of the diversity docket. That
function certainly still exists, and our data can assist Congress in
that enterprise. Congress could use our data, for example, to
calculate the likely impact of a proposed increase, both in terms of
how many cases would be eliminated and which ones. Congress
could then make an informed decision about whether a proposed
increase achieved a desired effect and whether any side effects on
the composition of the surviving cases were acceptable. But
Congress could also use our data proactively to reshape the
diversity docket, adopting increases not in spite of their differential
impacts but in pursuit of them.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMOUNT IN
CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT
This section traces the history of the amount in controversy
requirement for general diversity jurisdiction. We begin at the
founding, examining the circumstances that led to the inclusion of
an amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction in
the First Judiciary Act. We then track the changes to the amount
requirement over the ensuing 230 years to its current figure of
$75,000. Finally, we attempt to identify the policy goals behind the
amount in controversy requirement. Important questions to
explore include what purpose the amount in controversy
requirement serves, why it was set originally at $500, and what
factors have motivated Congress to make periodic adjustments.
A. The Amount in Controversy Requirement From 1789 to Present
Nothing in the Constitution limits access to the federal courts
based on the amount in dispute.10 But Article III gives Congress
10. See James M. Underwood, The Late, Great Diversity Jurisdiction, 57 CASE W. L. REV.
179, 218 (2006) (“There is no doubt that Article III in no way requires there to be any
minimum amount in controversy for Congress to permit district courts to exercise any type
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broad powers to increase or decrease the flow of cases into federal
courts. A key technique available to Congress—and one that it has
used in numerous ways since the Founding—is to limit access
based on the amount in controversy in the dispute.11
No aspect of federal jurisdiction illustrates this structure more
lucidly than diversity jurisdiction. New law students are often
surprised to learn that the amount in controversy requirement for
diversity jurisdiction is statutory, not constitutional. Article III
explicitly provides for the possibility of diversity jurisdiction, but it
imposes no amount in controversy requirement.12 If Congress
wanted to, it could confer diversity jurisdiction over penny
disputes. On the other hand, Congress is not obligated to confer any
of constitutional subject matter jurisdiction.”). The only amount threshold in the Constitution
is found in the Seventh Amendment, which preserves the right of trial by jury in cases where
the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”). That provision,
however, speaks to practice in, rather than access to, the federal courts. The likely purpose
of the $20 threshold was to give Congress the option of creating a federal small claims court
in which judges presided without juries. See Margreth Barrett, The Constitutional Right to Jury
Trial: A Historical Exception for Small Monetary Claims, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 125, 129 (1987).
11. While the amount in controversy requirement is most often associated with the
general diversity statute, Congress has used an amount in controversy requirement in many
other contexts to regulate access to federal courts. For over a century, from 1875 until 1980,
the general federal question statute contained an amount in controversy requirement. See
13D WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3561.1 (2008) (providing a
history of the amount in controversy requirement for federal questions jurisdiction). Even
now there are small pockets of federal law that can only be invoked in federal court if an
amount in controversy requirement is met. Statutory interpleader actions are subject to a
modest $500 amount in controversy requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335. Similarly, certain civil
suits against the United States are subject to a $10,000 amount in controversy maximum. See
28 U.S.C. § 1346. And subject to various limitations, the Class Action Fairness Act provides
for diversity jurisdiction where aggregated class claims exceed $5 million. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(2).
12. See 14AA WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3701, 246–47
(2011). The framers were certainly familiar with the concept of using an amount in
controversy requirement to limit court access because such mechanisms were common in the
states. See Thomas E. Baker, The History and Tradition of the Amount in Controversy Requirement:
A Proposal to “Up the Ante” in Diversity Jurisdiction, 102 F.R.D. 299, 302–03 (1984). But if the
framers ever discussed including an amount in controversy requirement in Article III, no
records preserve what was said. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 484 (1928). The idea of a Constitutional amount in
controversy requirement was discussed in some states during the ratification process See
Baker, supra, at 303; Friendly, supra, at 499; WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE
JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 20 (Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990). Once the Constitution
was ratified, the debate shifted to Congress.
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diversity jurisdiction on the lower federal courts.13 Thus, whether
to limit diversity jurisdiction through an amount in controversy
requirement and, if so, the amount at which to set it are matters that
the Constitution leaves to Congress’s judgment.14
The general diversity jurisdiction statute has—and always has
had—an amount in controversy requirement. Congress included a
$500 amount in controversy requirement when it first conferred
diversity jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789.15 As shown in
Table 1, in the 230 years since then, Congress has changed the
statutory amount required seven times.
Table 1: Summary of Legislation concerning Amount in Controversy in
Diversity Jurisdiction
Year

Statutory Amount

1789

500

Interval Since Last Change

Percentage Increase

1801

400

12 years

-20%

1802

500

1 year

25%

1888

2,000

86 years

300%

1911

3,000

23 years

50%

1958

10,000

47 years

233%

1988

50,000

30 years

400%

1996

75,000

8 years

50%

With one notable exception, the trend has been consistently—
albeit intermittently—upward. The exception happened in 1801,
when the amount required was reduced from $500 to $400 as part
of the Midnight Judges Act passed by the outgoing Federalist
Congress.16 Though no conclusive record exists of the reason for the
reduction, some have speculated that it was designed to provide a

13. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 441 (1850); Turner v. Bank of America, U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799).
14. 14AA WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, § 3701, at 247.
15. See Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73, §§ 11–12 (1789).
16. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT:
A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 21–30 (1927) (providing a general overview of the
Midnight Judges Act and its repeal); see also Max Farrand, The Judiciary Act of 1801, 5 AM. HIST.
REV. 682 (1900); Erwin C. Surrency, The Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 53 (1958).
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federal forum for claims arising out of the confiscated Lord Fairfax
estate.17 The era of the Midnight Judges Act did not last long. Now
in the hands of the Democratic-Republican Party, Congress
repealed the Act the following year, reinstating the $500 amount in
controversy requirement.18
Since 1802, the amount in controversy requirement for diversity
jurisdiction has risen periodically to its current $75,000 level. There
is no clear pattern to the timing of the increases. Congress waited
almost 100 years (1789–1887) before raising the amount above its
original $500. Later changes have come at intervals between as
much as 47 years (1911–1958) and as little as 8 years (1988–1996),
with an average interval during this period of 28 years. Based on
that schedule, the next increase might be expected in 2024. There is
also no clear pattern to the size of the increases. Three of the
increases (1888, 1958, 1988) have tripled the amount or more, while
two of them (1911 and 1996) increased the amount by just 50%.
While there is a positive correlation between the interval
between increases and their size,19 it is weak and does not suggest
that Congress has been following any type of formula. When
Congress increased the amount in controversy in 1911, it did so
after 23 years and increased it by just 50%. But when Congress
increased the amount in controversy in 1988, it did so after
just 30 years and increased it by 400%. If one is to try to
understand Congress’s activity, one must look beyond the data set
out in Table 1.
B. Policy and Goals of the Amount in Controversy
From the founding, the amount in controversy requirement has
been seen as a key tool to keep the diversity docket in check. In the
framers’ era, the Anti-Federalist opponents of the proposed federal
judiciary preferred that Article III not provide for diversity
jurisdiction at all, but also urged amount in controversy limits as a
fallback.20 In more recent times, opponents of diversity jurisdiction
17. See Baker, supra note 12, at 305; Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 78 (1923); FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra
note 16, at 24–25 n.66.
18. See Baker, supra note 12, at 307.
19. The three largest increases occurred after the three longest intervals, while the two
smallest increases occurred after the two shortest intervals.
20. See Baker, supra note 12, at 303; RITZ, supra note 12, at 20.
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pressed for its abolition but also called for increases to the amount
in controversy requirement (and other reforms) as a fallback.21
Thus, for opponents of diversity jurisdiction, the amount in
controversy requirement has long functioned as a type of damage
control mechanism.
But the amount in controversy requirement isn’t just a
compromise made to appease the opposition. At the founding and
now, supporters of diversity jurisdiction have shared the view that
there should be some amount threshold.22 Without one, diversity
jurisdiction would extend to the smallest of cases, intruding too
deeply into state affairs and needlessly burdening federal
resources.23 The question has never been whether to have an
amount in controversy requirement but the amount at which it
should be set to properly allocate diverse-citizen cases between the
state and federal courts.
1. At the Founding
To identify the purpose of the amount in controversy
requirement, we must first understand the purpose of diversity
jurisdiction. The historic purpose of diversity jurisdiction was to
provide out-of-state litigants with a judicial forum they trust to
deliver fair and impartial justice.24 In part, the advocates of
diversity jurisdiction expressed the concern, oft repeated by the
Supreme Court25 and familiar to law students today, that out-of21. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97, 124 (1990)
(proposing that the amount be effectively increased by measuring only economic damages
and excluding pain and suffering damages and punitive damages); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 963, 966 (1979).
22. See Friendly, supra note 12, at 501. (“It seems to have been recognized from the
start that there must be a jurisdictional amount.”).
23. See infra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
24. See Scott Dodson, Beyond Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 69 DUKE L.J. 267, 271–83
(2019) (tracing the bias rationale from the founding to the modern era).
25. See, e.g., Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 111 (1898) (“The object of the
provisions of the constitution and statutes of the United States, in conferring upon the
[lower] [c]ourts of the United States jurisdiction of controversies between citizens of different
States of the Union . . . was to secure a tribunal presumed to be more impartial than a court
of the state in which one of the litigants resides.”); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 347
(1816) (“The constitution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire) that
state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes
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state litigants might encounter biased judges and juries in the state
courts.26 But fear of local bias was not the only concern driving the
push to provide a federal forum. Many state court systems
employed practices that did little to inspire confidence.27
Commercial interests also worried about pro-debtor legislatures.28
Some have argued that these concerns were overstated.29 But
even if the claims of local bias were unfounded, and even if the state
courts could in fact be trusted, the perceptions and emotions that
fueled those concerns were still a powerful force that threatened to
frustrate the unquestioned federal interest in promoting a robust
and integrated national economy. As Frankfurter and Landis put it,
“[t]his fear of parochial prejudice, dealing unjustly with litigants
from other states and foreign countries, undermined the sense of
security necessary for commercial intercourse.”30 Diversity
jurisdiction would provide out-of-state citizens a forum they
could trust, thereby giving them more confidence to engage in
interstate activities.31
The Federalist advocates prevailed, and Congress included
diversity jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789. It was a victory
born of compromise. While the Act created a national judiciary and
obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of
justice.”); Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 87 (1809) (“The judicial department was
introduced into the American constitution under impressions, and with views, which are too
apparent not to be perceived by all. However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the
states will administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every
description, it is not less true that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on
this subject, or views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors,
that it has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and
a citizen, or between citizens of different states.”).
26. See WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3601, at 12–15 (13th
ed. 2009); Friendly, supra note 12, at 492–93; Warren, supra note 17, at 83 (“The chief and only
real reason for this diverse citizenship jurisdiction was to afford a tribunal in which a
foreigner or citizen of another State might have the law administered free from the local
prejudices or passions which might prevail in a State Court against foreigners or noncitizens.”); FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 16, at 8, n.15; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80
(Alexander Hamilton) (citing risk of local bias as supporting a national judiciary to hear
claims between citizens of different states).
27. See Friendly, supra note 12, at 497–98.
28. See id. at 495; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 26, § 3601, at 15–16.
29. See Friendly, supra note 12, at 493–95 (concluding that an examination of reported
case outcomes from the states during the period under the Articles of Confederation
disclosed no evidence of local bias).
30. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 16, at 8–9.
31. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 26, § 3601, at 18–20.
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established diversity jurisdiction, it did not extend the jurisdiction
of the federal courts to the fullest extent of Article III.32 Most
notably, it contained no provision for a general federal question
jurisdiction.33 The scope of the diversity jurisdiction conferred in
the Act reflects a further compromise. The opponents of diversity
jurisdiction had long viewed an amount in controversy
requirement as a way to blunt the impact of diversity jurisdiction
should it come to exist.34 While they failed in their efforts to
enshrine an amount in controversy requirement in the
Constitution, they achieved a partial victory in Congress with the
inclusion of a $500 amount in controversy requirement in the Act.
Diversity jurisdiction would exist, but it would be limited.
Though 200 years of diversity practice has conditioned us to
reflexively think of using the amount in controversy as a limiting
factor, it is not the only way one could cabin the diversity docket.
The most likely alternative would be to exclude particular types of
cases.35 For example, Congress could cut the diversity docket
drastically—some estimate by roughly 50%—by excluding
personal injury suits.36 But the first Congress obviously took a
different path, choosing to restrict diversity access based on the
amount in controversy. That choice makes sense in light of the antibias rationale for diversity jurisdiction prevailing at the time.37
32. See Baker, supra note 12, at 303; see also Warren, supra note 17, at 67—68, 131.
33. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 16, at 10–11.
34. See supra note 12. A proposal to create a constitutional amount in controversy
requirement of $1500 was even made while Congress was debating the First Judiciary Act.
See Baker, supra note 12, at 304; Warren, supra note 17, at 127.
35. The “domestic relations” exception to diversity jurisdiction can be viewed as a
type of subject-matter exclusion. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992). The
exclusion is indirect, however, in that the matters that fall within the domestic relations
exception are excluded because they are not considered “civil actions” as that term is defined
in the diversity statute, and not because they are prohibited by a specific exclusion. Id. at 700.
36. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador, A New Approach to Limiting Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.A.
J. 383, 384–85 (1960) (proposing to eliminate personal injury suits from diversity jurisdiction).
37. Some scholars today emphasize that the constitutional authority for diversity
jurisdiction has been harnessed to serve other purposes, most notably to create a federal
forum for complex cases that might not be able to be brought, or would proceed inefficiently,
in state court. See Dodson, supra note 24, at 301–08; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley,
Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7, 22 (1986). For
example, Congress has tapped into its Article III diversity authority to pass the Federal
Interpleader Act, the Multiparty Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, and the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, all of which create a federal forum for efficient
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There is no intuitive reason to think that outsiders are more or less
at risk of being hometowned in contract or tort cases. But in either
case type, the potential for harm—at least as measured in financial
impact—is greatest as the stakes rise.38 A properly calibrated
amount in controversy requirement provides protection in cases
where the risk of financial harm is greatest, while limiting federal
intrusion into everyday affairs unlikely to disrupt interstate
commerce.39 “The decision to control caseloads by means of a
jurisdictional minimum, then, reflects a congressional decision to
arrange priorities according to a case’s financial worth.”40
That still leaves the line to be drawn.41 When Congress drew the
line for the first time in the Judiciary Act of 1789, it drew it at $500.42
The $500 figure can be traced back to Oliver Ellsworth, who had
been given principal drafting responsibility for the proposed
judiciary act.43 No record exists why Ellsworth selected $500. There
is also no record of any debate in Congress about whether $500 was
the right figure.
In summary, when Congress included an amount in
controversy requirement in the Judiciary Act of 1789, it was
primarily motivated by judicial federalism.44 Its objective was to
strike a proper balance between the federal interests served by
diversity jurisdiction and a proper respect for the state judicial
systems. Congress chose to strike that balance by restricting access
to the federal courts to suits with a value exceeding $500.

aggregate litigation. See Dodson, supra note 24, at 301–08. But the fact that Congress can use—
and has used—its Article III diversity power to achieve other goals does not alter the fact
that all historic accounts suggest that when Congress used its Article III diversity power in
1789 to create “diversity jurisdiction” as we commonly understand it, Congress’s purpose
was to counteract the threat (real or perceived) of local bias against out-of-state litigants.
38. See Baker, supra note 12, at 320.
39. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 39
(1990) (“To limit federal court intrusion into everyday lawsuits, the first Congress established
a jurisdictional minimum of $500.”).
40. 15A MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 102.100.
41. See Baker, supra note 12, at 301–02.
42. See Judiciary Act, supra note 15.
43. Id. Ellsworth mentioned the $500 figure in a letter he wrote to Judge Richard Law
during the Committee process. See id. at 500–01; Warren, supra note 17, at 60–61.
44. See Baker, supra note 12, at 305–06.
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2. As the Amount Has Changed
Changes to the amount in controversy requirement were
inevitable. The federal courts established by the Judiciary Act of
1789 were a grand experiment.45 Along with many other features of
the federal court system, the $500 amount in controversy
requirement would be tested in the field. Would the $500 threshold
in fact strike a happy balance between the competing federal and
state interests? Some expected a quick round of changes as defects
were exposed and consequences made clear.46 In the longer run,
like any fixed-amount threshold based on the conditions of the day,
the $500 figure was certain to be in need of updating at some point
to adjust for changed conditions, including simple inflation.
In the 230 years since 1789, Congress has raised the amount in
controversy requirement five times (setting aside the reinstatement
to $500 after the short-lived reduction to $400 brought about by the
Midnight Judges Act).47 As discussed later, the three most recent
increases were inflation adjustments.48 They were not designed to
bump up the stakes required for diversity jurisdiction but to have
the dollar threshold reflect the stakes previously set. In contrast, the
first two increases were overtly designed to raise the stakes
required with the goal of shrinking the diversity docket.
The first real increase took place in 1887, when Congress raised
the required amount to $2,000.49 It had been a century since
Ellsworth fixed his eye on $500. Our modern sense of economics
might lead us to conclude that the increase was an adjustment for a
century’s worth of inflation, but in fact overall inflation during that
period had been modest. As shown in Figure 1, if the goal had been
simply to adjust for inflation, the increase would have been only to
$540. Instead, Congress was reacting to a docket crisis in the federal
courts, and it reacted by (among other things) eliminating the
bottom tier of the diversity docket.

45. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 16, at 5 (asserting that “the Judiciary Act
was avowedly experimental”).
46. See Baker, supra note 12, at 304.
47. See supra Table 1.
48. See infra notes 62–78 and accompanying text.
49. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, amended by Act of August 13, 1888,
ch. 866, § 1, 25 Stat. 433.
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Figure 1: Logged Amount in Controversy Adjustments
and Inflation

Notes: For visual clarity, the vertical axis represents logged-dollar amounts. The horizontal
axis represents time. The red lines are the active statutory amount. The thick black lines
represent the inflation-adjusted statutory amount. The light gray lines represent continued
inflation-adjusted statutory amounts (assuming there had been no change in the statutory
amount). For example, the bottom gray line represents the inflation-adjusted value of the
1789 jurisdictional amount.
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In the years following the Civil War, the federal docket was
bursting at the seams.50 Part of it stemmed from the growth of the
country. The country’s population had expanded tenfold since
1789, generating more and more disputes.51 But other major causes
included the enactment of general federal question jurisdiction in
1875, an increase in diversity jurisdiction caused by the developing
doctrine of corporate citizenship, and the creation of new grounds
for removal.52 The federal judiciary was overwhelmed with cases.
Faced with a choice of either greatly expanding the size of the
federal judiciary or reducing its statutory jurisdiction, Congress
pursued the latter.53 Among the many changes was to reduce the
diversity docket by quadrupling the amount in controversy
requirement to $2,000.54
The 1887 change marked a significant shift in Congress’s
approach to federal jurisdiction. The federal courts were now in the
“federal question” business, and Congress freed up resources for it
by striking a new judicial federalism balance for diversity
jurisdiction.55 In justifying the increase to $2,000, the proponents
also stressed a goal of protecting persons involved in small statelaw disputes from the assertedly higher cost and longer disposition
time of litigating in federal court.56

50. See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, supra note 16, at 60 (describing “an enormous
increase in the in the business of the district and the circuit courts”); id. at 86 (stating that the
lower courts “were staggering under a load which made speedy and effective judicial
administration impossible”).
51. See 18 Cong. Rec. 613–14 (1887) (remarks of Rep. Culbertson).
52. See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, supra note 16, at 60–69.
53. See id. at 88–94; Baker, supra note 12, at 307–08.
54. See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, supra note 16, at 93–95; Felix Frankfurter,
Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 513
(1928) (discussing the new restrictions on diverse-citizenship cases).
55. The view that the primary mission of the federal courts is to resolve federal-law
cases has become sufficiently entrenched that, a century later, the Federal Courts Study
Committee described the amount in controversy requirement as “a pragmatic but essentially
arbitrary attempt to limit the diversion of federal courts from their primary role of litigating
federal constitutional and statutory issues.” See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 40 (1990) [hereinafter FCSC REPORT].
56. See 18 Cong. Rec. 613 (Jan. 13, 1887) (remarks of Rep. Culbertson) (“The object of
the bill is to diminish the jurisdiction of the circuit courts and the Supreme Court of the
United States, to promote the convenience of the people, and to lessen the burden and
expense of litigation.”); 18 Cong. Rec. 2544 (Mar. 2, 1887) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds)
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Just twenty-three years later, in 1911, Congress raised the
amount threshold from $2,000 to $3,000 as part of a comprehensive
Revision of the Judicial Code.57 The main focus of reform at that
moment was to restructure the lower federal courts by fusing the
old district and circuit courts, both endowed with various types of
original jurisdiction, to create a single trial-level court.58 In the
process, Congress made several adjustments to the jurisdiction of
the district courts, including raising the amount in controversy
requirement by 50% to $3,000.59 The reasons given were the same
ones that prevailed in 1888—cutting the diversity docket would
help alleviate the burden on the federal judiciary and spare litigants
with smaller claims from the higher expense of the federal courts.60
Once again, inflation had nothing to do with it.61 As shown by
Figure 1, the inflation-adjusted value of a $2,000 claim in 1888 was
still $2,000 in 1911. Thus the increase, though modest in size, was
intended not to maintain an inflation-adjusted balance but to once

(expressing concern for “the inconvenience and wrong of subjecting mere local affairs to the
great expense of national jurisdiction”).
The brief remarks in the Congressional Record do not elaborate on whether the
increase was intended to protect would-be plaintiffs or defendants. In practice, it would
protect both. While plaintiffs were always free to file their $600 cases in state court,
defendants could remove them. The $2,000 threshold protects plaintiffs by barring removal
of state-court cases up to that amount. The increase also protects defendants because it bars
plaintiffs from originally filing in federal court. Whether Congress was motivated by
concerns for both sides is not discernable from the record.
57. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091. The revision of the Judicial Code
was itself part of the comprehensive revision of the Laws. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra
note 16, at 130–31,141.
58. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 16, at 133.
59. The House had approved an amendment that would have raised it to $5,000. See
46 Cong. Rec. 1077 (Jan. 18, 1911). However, the Senate resisted the higher increase and the
House yielded. See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, supra note 16, at 141.
60. See Baker, supra note 12, at 310–11. This time, the discussion about protecting
litigants from the expense of federal court centered on the effect the increase would have on
removal. During a House debate, a number of speakers asserted that ordinary plaintiffs with
$4,000-level claims were foregoing damages in state court to stay under the $2,000 amount
in controversy requirement and avoid removal to the more expensive “rich man’s” federal
court. Thus, for many, the primary benefit of raising the amount in controversy to $5,000 was
to increase the ability of the “poor man” to seek justice in his own courts without threat of
removal. See 46 Cong. Rec. 1074 (Jan. 18, 1911) (remarks of Rep. Graham); id. at 1075 (remarks
of Rep. Sims); id. at 1076 (remarks of Rep. Cullop).
61. One Representative did invoke inflation, stating that “[f]ive hundred dollars [in
1789] was more to the poor man than $5,000 now.” Id. at 1075 (remarks of Rep. Mann). No
other mention of inflation appears, and historic inflation statistics refute the assertion.
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again alter the judicial federalism status quo by ratcheting up the
stakes required for diversity jurisdiction.
Congress next raised the amount in controversy requirement in
1958,62 more than tripling it to $10,000.63 The increase was largely
in response to a surge in case filings after World War II.64 For over
a decade, Congress had been adding judgeships but still could not
keep pace and looked for other solutions. As an alternative,
Congress began considering raising the amount in controversy
requirement.65 At roughly the same time, the United States Judicial
Conference commissioned a committee to study the causes of the
problem and possible solutions.66 The Committee returned with a
strong endorsement of diversity jurisdiction, but recommended
that the amount in controversy requirement be raised to $7,500.67
The Judicial Conference endorsed the proposal, and later updated
its position to support an even higher increase to $10,000.68
This time, inflation played a central role in the increase. The
period between 1911 and 1958 saw consumer prices roughly triple.
As shown in Figure 1, an increase to over $9,000 would have been
warranted just to account for inflation. Congress ultimately settled
on $10,000 as a threshold that would restore the norm that diversity
cases be “substantial” (on an inflation-adjusted basis) and in doing
so eliminated the congestion that had been caused by the
introduction of “petty” cases as inflation ate away at the impact of
the previous $3,000 limit.69 The Report from the House Judiciary
Committee, which presumably carried the day with Congress, was
quite clear on this rationale:
The present requirement of $3,000 has been on the statute books
since 1911 and obviously the value of the dollar in terms of its
purchasing power has undergone marked depreciation since that
date. . . . It is apparent that since $3,000 was the smallest amount
that was considered substantial in 1911 for problems of Federal
62. Perhaps surprisingly, Congress did not increase the amount as part of the
comprehensive revision of the Judicial Code in 1948. See Baker, supra note 12, at 311–12.
63. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415.
64. See Baker, supra note 12, at 312–13; H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 2 (1958) (hereinafter
H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706).
65. See Baker, supra note 12, at 313; H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 13–14 (listing bills introduced).
66. H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 7.
67. Id. at 16, 18–20.
68. Id. at 7.
69. Baker, supra note 12, at 314–16.
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jurisdiction, there is today no substantiality in such an amount for
jurisdictional problems.70

Thus, the increase to $10,000 was intended to bring the amount in
controversy up to date—to restore the value-threshold status quo
set in 1911—with some cushion to account for the inevitable further
erosion by inflation.71
The next increase occurred in 1988, when the amount required
was raised to $50,000.72 The stated purpose of the increase was
again to reduce the number of diversity cases in the federal courts
and to adjust for inflation.73 In reality, it was mostly the latter. It had
been 30 years since the last increase. As shown in Figure 1, it would
take an increase to $40,000 just to account for inflation. The
proponents of the increase understood just that, acknowledging
that “the adjustment largely reflects inflation.”74 As in 1958,
Congress went with a higher number to account for future inflation.75
Just eight years later, in 1996, Congress raised the amount in
controversy requirement again, this time to $75,000. It represented
another effort at holding the diversity docket in check.76 Once
again, the increase can be attributed in large part to inflation. By
itself, the high inflation rate prevailing at that time would have
warranted an increase from $50,000 to over $66,000. Indeed, the
constant erosion of the amount in controversy threshold by high
inflation had led to a proposal that Congress not just increase the

70. H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 3.
71. Baker, supra note 12, at 315–16. In contrast, the 1958 Act also included the now
familiar provision deeming a corporation to be a citizen of its state of incorporation and its
principal place of business. The purpose of that reform was clearly to alter the status quo by
eliminating a category of cases deemed not deserving of federal jurisdiction. See H.R. REP.
NO. 85-1706, at 3 (“In adopting this legislation, the committee feels that it will bring the
minimum amount in controversy up to a reasonable level by contemporary standards and
that it will ease the workload of our Federal courts by reducing the number of cases involving
corporations which come into Federal district courts on the fictional premise that a diversity of
citizenship exists.”) (emphasis added).
72. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat.
4646 (1988).
73. 14AA ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE JURISDICTION § 3701
(4th ed. 2021) (hereinafter MILLER).
74. H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 45 (1988).
75. Id. (“[S]ince Congress is slow to act in this area and may not revisit the issue for
another three decades, it is sound policy to peg the amount in controversy at this time with
a reasonable inflation cushion in mind.”).
76. MILLER § 3701, supra note 73.
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amount in controversy requirement but index it to inflation.77
Congress declined to implement the indexing proposal, simply
saying that the increase to $75,000 would “assist the Federal
judiciary in reducing its increasing caseload” while also providing
a federal forum for “claims with substantial amounts at issue. . . .”78
But the change seems to assume that the prior amounts set had
drawn an appropriate “substantiality” line and just needed
updating. The reduction in workload would come from excising
the insubstantial claims that had crept in as a result of inflation,
rather than raising the bar to exclude claims that would not have
qualified under the early amounts on an inflation-adjusted basis.
In summary, Congress’s approach to the amount in controversy
requirement has always been grounded in a pragmatic approach to
judicial federalism. Congress continues to believe in providing a
federal forum for some state-law cases between parties from
different states, but it has never wanted them all. Congress has
always used the monetary stakes of the suit as a convenient sorting
tool. In times of inflation, a monetary threshold must be increased
to prevent a de facto lowering of the stakes required. Many of the
increases to the diversity statute’s amount in controversy
requirement—especially those made in the last 100 years—seem
designed largely to maintain the federalism status quo. But
Congress has also demonstrated that, when it wants to, it knows it
can use the amount in controversy as a lever, up or down, to
reallocate state-law cases between the federal and state courts.
II. DATA, APPROACH, AND METHODS
Given this history, future increases to the amount in
controversy are all but certain. But in what amount? And with what
effects? If Congress today were looking for data to formulate
answers to those questions, it would find only limited guidance.
The only comprehensive analysis of which we are aware was
77. S. REP. NO. 104-366, at 29 (1996). The suggestion originated in the 1990 Report of
the Federal Courts Study Committee. FCSC REPORT, supra note 55, at 42. That
recommendation was later adopted by the U.S. Judicial Conference, see REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 60 (Sep. 1990) (hereinafter
JCUS-SEP 90), and included in the Judicial Conference’s 1995 Long Range Plan for the Federal
Courts. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS 30 (Dec. 1995) (Recommendation 7(b)(2)).
78. S. REP. NO. 104–366, at 29 (1996).
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conducted over fifty years ago in the period leading up to the 1958
increase from $3,000 to $10,000.79 A limited analysis contained in a
1988 study of the budgetary impact of possible changes to diversity
jurisdiction is now also more than thirty years old.80 Those studies,
while still valuable to our general understanding of the relationship
between the amount in controversy requirement and diversity
jurisdiction, cannot answer questions about how proposed changes
would affect the size and composition of the diversity docket
today.81 And they provide no guidance on a wide range of
questions we had that those studies did not address.
This article fills that gap. Using a novel hand-coded set of
pleadings in 2,900 cases, we examine what would happen if

79. The data appear in an attachment to the House Judiciary Committee Report
accompanying the bill that led to the 1958 increase. See H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, supra note 64.
The history behind the data—and how it came to be attached to the House Report—is
important. In 1950, the U.S. Judicial Conference appointed a Committee on Jurisdiction and
Venue to study various reform proposals that had been circulating in Congress. The
committee secured data from the Division of Procedural Studies and Statistics of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. The data covered cases filed during the first half of
fiscal year 1951 (the “1951 data”). The Committee included that data in its Report to the Chief
Justice and the Judicial Conference. That report was submitted to the House Judiciary
Committee as an attachment to a statement submitted by Joseph F. Spaniol, an attorney at
the Division of Procedural Studies and Statistics at the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts. In preparing his statement, Spaniol also collected data from the second quarter of
fiscal year 1957 (the “1957 data”). However, none of the actual studies that generated the
data appear in the House Judiciary Committee Report or any of the attachments. The data
are simply reported in tables appearing throughout these materials.
80. See ANTHONY PARTRIDGE, THE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF POSSIBLE CHANGES IN
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 13–17 (Federal Judicial Center, 1988).
81. Those studies address the federal diversity docket at the point in time of their
publication. The 1951 study provides detailed data, but much has changed since then. That
was before the era of mass torts. It was also before the proliferation of businesses operating
as LLCs or LLPs or other newfangled unincorporated entities. It is impossible to know how
these developments—let alone other factors like changes in the economy and attitudes about
litigation—might have altered the diversity docket in the ensuing seventy years. Moreover,
the utility of the 1951 data is limited by issues of transparency and methodology. The
available records indicate that the study coded cases based on amount claimed and “for which
the amount claimed is known.” H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 20. As we discuss infra, however,
the test is not what amount is claimed but the amount that is possible.
The 1988 study is arguably more probative since it provides a more recent
snapshot and employed a more reliable methodology for estimating the amount in
controversy. Specifically, the 1988 study did not rely on the amount stated in the ad damnum
clause; rather, one or both of two researchers read the complaints and removal notices (where
applicable) to identify the amount that the plaintiff plausibly could claim as damages. See
PARTRIDGE, supra note 80, at 13–15, 42–43. On the other hand, the 1988 study is over thirty
years old and is based on a sample of just 386 cases. See id. at 13.
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Congress raised the jurisdictional amount from its current $75,000
to three different levels: $250,000, $500,000, and $1 million. At each
of those levels, we examine how many cases likely would survive.
We also dig deeper and ask which cases would survive. Would
some types of cases and some types of litigants be affected more
than others? Would some districts be affected more than others? In
short, we seek to determine how various increases to the amount in
controversy requirement might reshape the diversity docket, both
in its size and composition.
This Part will explain our approach, our data collection
strategy, and the methods used. The next Part will present our
main findings.
A. Data & Approach
Our findings are based on a time-consuming data collection
effort. We began by selecting five federal districts: Minnesota,
Georgia Northern, New Jersey, Texas Northern, and Utah. These
five districts were not randomly selected and are not meant to be a
representative sample of the nation as a whole. All of our findings
must be read with this limitation in mind. We confined ourselves
to five districts because of data collection limitations and encourage
other researchers to test our findings in other settings. We did not
collect data on a random sample of all federal diversity cases
because of significant variation in state remedies laws that would
have made such data-collection unreliable.82 Accordingly, our data
collection prioritized accuracy over generalizability.
Nevertheless, the chosen five districts provide geographic
diversity and a good mix of economic, political, and social
conditions. They furnish a sufficiently solid base to cautiously
make general claims that exceed any other currently available
empirical evidence.

82. See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
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Figure 2: Selection of U.S. District Courts for Data Collection

Within each of these five districts we then selected a random
sample of diversity jurisdiction cases based on Federal Judicial
Center (“FJC”) data on cases completed in 2018.83 All in all we
collected data on 2,229 unique cases. Because of extensive data
reliability checks (described infra in section II.B) we collected data
on 667 of these cases multiple times. In total, the dataset includes
2,896 cases.
For each of these cases, we retrieved and read the original
complaints for cases originally filed in federal court and the notice
of removal and attachments for removed cases.84 After reading
them, we asked ourselves how a court in that jurisdiction would
83. 2018 was the last year for which data was available when we began our datacollection effort.
84. MILLER § 3702.3, supra note 73 (“As a starting point in the event of a challenge, the
court typically will rely upon the complaint and any materials attached to or referred to in
it, which often will make it ‘facially apparent’ that the amount in controversy requirement
has been met or cannot be met, thereby resolving the issue.”) (quoting Thompson v. La. Reg’l
Landfill Co., 365 F. Supp. 3d 725, 729 (E.D. La. 2019)).
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likely rule if there was a challenge to the jurisdictional amount
requirement and Congress had set a higher amount in
controversy.85 Instead of postulating a small increase in the
jurisdictional amount, we asked about the possible effects of large
increases. What would happen if Congress were to raise the
amount in controversy requirement to three different levels:
$250,000, $500,000, and $1 million.86 We choose such high numbers
to sharpen our findings. A modest change in the amount in
controversy (say, from $75,000 to $80,000) will likely produce an
effect that is difficult to observe with confidence. We wanted to
inquire if a big change in the amount in controversy produced an
observable effect.
In asking whether a given case could pass a much higher
amount in controversy, we applied the same standard a judge
would use if presented with that question: the legal certainty test.87

85. We also considered basing our study on amended complaints. Some might argue
that amended complaints better represent what a case is really about. We rejected this
approach for various reasons. First, jurisdictional disputes tend to be based on earlier filings
(though, of course, many exceptions exist). See MILLER § 3702.4, supra note 73 (“Under an
easily stated, well-settled principle, reflected in numerous cases . . . drawn from throughout
the federal judicial system, the existence or nonexistence of the amount in controversy
required for subject matter jurisdiction purposes is determined on the basis of the facts and
circumstances as of the time that an action is commenced in a federal court or arrives there
from a state court by way of removal.”). But cf. Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. U.S., 127 S. Ct. 1397,
1398 (2007) (“When a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and then voluntarily amends
the complaint, courts look to the amended complaint to determine jurisdiction.”). Second,
we were unable to define in a principled way the “right” amended complaint (is it the first,
the last, or the average?).
86. We also considered collecting data on a continuous variable for the amount in
controversy rather than breakpoints. We rejected this approach because of the imprecision
inherent in many complaints. Oftentimes there is insufficient information in a complaint to
determine the amount in controversy with surgical precision. Of course, sometimes the
amount in controversy can be identified down to dollars and pennies (e.g., in a debt
collection case where the debt is clear, and recovery of the debt is the only available remedy).
But more commonly the amount in controversy is a bit fuzzy. Most pleading rules do not
require a precise accounting. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(3). Some states do not require precise
accounting or do not even permit it for some types of actions. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC.
§ 425.10(b), NEV. R. CIV. P. 8(a), ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 8(b). Many complaints that we examined
articulated the amount in controversy generally. For those cases we thought it was more
realistic to code for whether the amount in controversy in a complaint passes a big gate (e.g.,
above or below $500,000) rather than seek to identify whether the amount in controversy
was $650,000 or $660,000.
87. WRIGHT & MILLER § 3702, supra note 73, at 280 (“[The legal certainty] test has been
repeated and applied in innumerable cases decided in every circuit.”).
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Under this standard, judges ask whether it could be shown88 to a legal
certainty that the amount in controversy cannot be recovered at the
various levels.89 Or, as some courts put it, can it be shown as a matter
of law that no reasonable jury could award that amount.90 Courts
generally accept the good faith ad damnum allegations in a plaintiff’s
complaint91 and do not require initial evidentiary submissions.92
This inquiry under the legal certainty test necessarily entails
attention to state remedies law.93 Federal courts in diversity cases
must look to forum law94 to determine available damages, including
special and punitive damages, and limitations on damages.95
88. The vague articulation is intentional here. Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing
federal subject matter jurisdiction while the removing defendant, in the removal context, has
the initial burden since it is invoking federal subject matter jurisdiction.
89. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 348 (1977) (reciting the
legal certainty standard); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938)
(“It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional
amount to justify dismissal.”).
90. See, e.g., Schober v. Schober, 761 F. App’x 127, 129 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Under the legal
certainty test, a case may be dismissed for failure to meet the amount in controversy
requirement if it appears to a ‘legal certainty’ that the claim is for less than the jurisdictional
amount. Such dismissal may be appropriate where the facts indicate that a plaintiff claimed
certain damages merely to obtain federal court jurisdiction, or where the court determines
that no reasonable jury could award that amount”) (internal citations omitted).
91. See, e.g., Onyiuke v. Cheap Tickets, Inc., 435 F. App’x 137, 139 (3d Cir. 2011) (“In
determining whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the Court generally accepts
the plaintiff’s good faith allegations.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2) (“If removal of a civil
action is sought on the basis of the jurisdiction conferred by section 1332(a), the sum demanded
in good faith in the initial pleading shall be deemed to be the amount in controversy . . .”).
92. See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014) (“[A]
defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. Evidence establishing the amount is
required by § 1446(c)(2)(B) only when the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the
defendant’s allegation.”).
93. Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 352–53 (1961) (“[T]he federal courts
must, of course, look to state law to determine the nature and extent of the right to be
enforced in a diversity case.”); Onyiuke v. Cheap Tickets, Inc., 435 F. App’x at 139 (“It
necessarily follows that whether the claims are for less than the jurisdictional amount
depends on what damages a plaintiff could conceivably recover under state law.”).
94. To be precise, federal courts must look to the forum state’s choice of law rules. See
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). The forum state’s choice of law
rules might select the forum state’s damages law, or it might select the damages law of
another state. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 171 (tort damages
governed by the law of the state with the most significant relationship to that issue).
95. Federal ceilings, while in effect, sometimes are less stringent than the state ceilings.
Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 410 (2003) (“[I]n practice, few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages will
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Because the law governing damages varies between jurisdictions
and is very complex, we did not select a random sample of federal
diversity cases from around the country but instead focused on five
districts. We assigned different teams of RAs to different districts
(and thus states and state-specific remedies law). We then trained
each team on the most important and most commonly used
damages rules for those jurisdictions. This approach sensitized our
data-collection efforts to variation in state remedies law.
We instructed our RAs to assume that the forum state’s choiceof-law provisions would pick forum damages law. For practical
reasons, it was not feasible to ask our RAs to make choice-of-law
predictions. To begin, in most cases there would be no way of
knowing whether a party intended to ask the forum court to apply
the law of another state.96 And even if a request to apply non-forum
law was clearly raised in the materials we asked our RAs to inspect,
asking them to predict what law would ultimately be chosen would
have been an impossible task. Finally, had we asked our RAs to
follow the choice-of-law trail, we would have needed to educate
them about, and potentially have them apply, the damages law of
every state. In short, incorporating choice-of-law into our coding
process would have made the enterprise unworkable. We
recognize that, as a consequence, our approach could result in some
cases being misclassified (e.g., they meet a postulated raised
jurisdictional amount under forum damages law but fall short
under foreign damages law, or vice versa). However, we estimate,
without knowing, that any such situations would be infrequent and
would not result in systematic bias. In the aggregate, the errors

satisfy due process.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14 (“No defendant shall be liable for
punitive damages in any action in an amount in excess of five times the liability of that
defendant for compensatory damages or $350,000, whichever is greater.”).
96. Courts typically apply forum-state law unless one of the parties seeks the
application of another state’s law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 136, cmt. h. While parties must provide notice at some point that they will seek the
application of non-forum law, it need not be given in the pleadings. See, e.g., Fed. R. CIV. P.
44.1 (notice of intent to seek foreign law must be provided “by a pleading or other writing.”).
Thus, instructing our RAs to examine the complaint or the removal notice for an indication
that non-forum law was being sought would not have captured all of the cases where choice
of law was ultimately raised.
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resulting from our approach are likely to flow in both directions in
roughly offsetting amounts.97
In addition to determining whether a complaint would meet an
elevated jurisdictional amount requirement or not, we also
collected data on the number of plaintiffs and defendants in an
action and various types of relief requests (economic damages,
noneconomic, punitive, declaratory).98 Most complaints do not
allow for precise allocations of each type of relief. Thus, the data
cannot tell us what percentage of the requested relief originates
from, say, punitive damages. Instead, these are simple binary
variables, indicating whether the complaint asks for any of this type
of relief. The FJC dataset also contains various additional
information on a given case that we will utilize in our analysis
section (e.g., pro se and IFP status).99
B. Data Reliability
Our findings are only as good as the data on which they are
based. Accordingly, we built into our data-collection effort multiple
types of reliability checks to gauge the quality of our data. Our first
type of check was intra-RA reliability. Here, we had the same RAs
code the same case multiple times (often days, weeks, or months
apart). This allows us to check whether RAs are coding consistently
across time. Our next type of check was an inter-RA reliability
check. Since we assigned teams of RAs to different districts, we
were able to assign different RAs within each team some of the
same cases. Thus, some cases were coded by two or three RAs.
This allows us to check whether teams of RAs code consistently.
Next, the authors also coded some cases themselves, thus
providing an additional reliability check.
97. The factor most likely to undermine these assumptions would be if a jurisdiction
imposed a hard cap on a type of damages that is common and generally indeterminate—e.g.,
a hard cap on pain and suffering damages in tort cases. Because none of our jurisdictions has
a generally applicable fixed cap on the recovery of noneconomic damages, our data might
understate the impact of raising the amount in controversy requirement if a significant
number of the cases in our study would have followed the law of a jurisdiction that has a
fixed cap on those or similar damages.
98. See, e.g., Bell v. Preferred Life Assur. Soc’y, 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943) (“Where both
actual and punitive damages are recoverable under a complaint[‘s allegation,] . . . each must be
considered to the extent claimed in determining whether the jurisdictional amount is involved.”).
99. While not beyond reproach, the FJC dataset is an invaluable resource that is far
beyond anything we could have collected.
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In all of this we did not expect perfect matches. Not only is
hand-coded docket research inherently imprecise, but the
complaints are also often vague and allow for divergent
interpretations.100 This is not confined to researchers evaluating
complaints but judges, similarly, are confronted with the difficult
task of evaluating fuzzy complaints under the legal certainty
standard. Judges have significant discretion in determining the
jurisdictional amount.101 Predictably some judges utilize this
discretion more than others. This variation exists because of
diametrically opposed policy goals embedded in the jurisdictional
determination.102 Depending on the sensibilities of a given judge,
she might stress some policy goals more than others and probe the
amount in controversy requirement more thoroughly than other
judges. Our data collection tried to mirror the task judges face and
thus reproduced these competing demands and the, at times, fuzzy
answers. Thus, our reliability checks seek to ascertain not whether
cases were coded identically but with reasonable consistency.
Table 2 presents a summary of our reliability checks. Each row
represents one type of reliability check. The first three columns
indicate the proximity of repeatedly coded cases. In the “Identical”
column are cases that received an identical amount in controversy
entries in subsequent rounds. Cases in the “one off” column
indicate cases where subsequent coding put them one step higher
or lower than the original coding. The next column collects cases
100. See generally Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 3
(2011) (“Although I generally agree with the value of jurisdictional clarity as an ideal, the reality
is that jurisdictional clarity is largely a chimera, done in by its own inherent complexities.”).
101. See, e.g., Foret v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 918 F.2d 534, 537 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The
trial court is not required to follow any set procedure in determining whether the
jurisdictional amount has been satisfied. The blueprint of the method of determining the
length and breadth of the amount in controversy is entirely within the discretion of the trial
court.”) (internal citations omitted).
102. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Hewes St. Realty Corp., 359 F.2d 96, 98–99 (2d Cir. 1966)
(Waterman, J.) (“One cannot underestimate the difficulties involved in developing clear and
just rules to assist the district courts in determining whether an amount in controversy in a
case exceeds $10,000. The problem is especially difficult because the major considerations
tug in precisely opposite directions. On the one hand, with mounting federal case loads, as
Chief Judge Lumbard recently has stated, ‘it has become doubly important that the district
courts take measures to discover those suits which ought never to have been brought in the
federal court and to dismiss them when the court is convinced to a legal certainty that the
plaintiff cannot recover an amount in excess of $10,000.’ On the other hand, we must not
permit a preliminary jurisdictional determination regarding recoverable damages to deprive
a plaintiff unfairly of a federal court trial of a case on its merits.”).
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where subsequent entries were more than one step off. In the “NA”
column we included cases where one coder felt confident enough
to specify an amount in controversy, but subsequent coders
indicated that they are unable to pass judgment one way or the
other.103 The last column tallies the number of cases for each type of
reliability check.
Table 2: Data Reliability Summary

Intra-RA
Inter-RA
Professors-RA

Identical

One Off

More than One

60 (73%)
227 (59%)
123 (62%)

7 (9%)
58 (15%)
43 (22%)

0 (0%)
15 (4%)
18 (9%)

NAs

Total #

15 (18%)
85 (22%)
16 (8%)

82
385
200

Notes: Because of rounding the percentages might not add up to 100%. Also, because of
random selection of cases to check some cases are in multiple categories (e.g., RA duplicated
own work on a case and also another RA checked that case).

Table 2 shows that the brunt of cases were coded identically or
within one breakpoint under different check scenarios. This
provides confidence in the reliability of the data collection method.
That being said, we want to stress that damage allegations are
squishy. We suspect that different judges would evaluate most
cases similarly but disagree on some, just as our RAs and we did.
C. Methods
We primarily utilize two methods to analyze our data: modified
Kaplan-Meier104 survival functions and Cox Proportional Hazard
Regression models. Both of these methods originate in the vast
literature on survival methods and estimators. Initially much of
this literature was utilized to understand the temporal aspects of
103. We allowed in the instructions to RAs that they can indicate an inability to decide
whether a given case passed a given jurisdictional amount threshold. Instead of forcing them
to decide when they were deeply uncertain, we believe the existing data is more reliable and
informative because RAs could indicate a basic level of confidence and uncertainty.
Typically, such uncertainty arose for higher jurisdictional amounts. This is a variation of
what the literature on survival methods calls “right censoring” (a patient leaves the study
before an event that may or may not have happened can be observed). There are no instances
of “left censoring” in our data (when the event of interest has already occurred before
enrollment) because all cases survive a zero-dollar jurisdictional amount.
104. See E.L. Kaplan & Paul Meier, Nonparametric Estimation from Incomplete
Observations, 53 AM. STAT. ASS’N J. 457, 458 (1958).

1681

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:6 (2022)

medical treatment, comparing the survival and death rates across
time for treatment and control populations. The survival estimators
have been generalized to many other contexts105 beyond the
survival of patients, including failure of machine parts,
unemployment,106 and spoiling food. Survival estimators have also
been used in a broad range of legal scholarship, ranging from the
economic consequences of the Homestead Act of 1862,107 the impact
of legal interventions on Guantánamo Bay detentions,108 female
attrition from private law practice,109 bail jumping,110 to the speed
of administrative rulemaking.111 To our knowledge, no scholarship
has utilized survival methods to understand jurisdiction generally
or amount in controversy specifically.
Our main methodological innovation in this Article is to
substitute the temporal component in survival analysis with a
measure of jurisdictional amount. Instead of asking on which day
a machine fails, we ask at which jurisdictional amount a case fails.
For data-collection reasons, we measure such “failure” at different
breakpoints ($75,000, $250,000, $500,000, and $1 million). We
estimate the points between these breakpoints.112 The guiding
principle when creating these estimates is decline. Just as no dead
patient can spring back to life one week after his demise, neither

105. Different academic fields utilize different names: event history analysis
(sociology), duration analysis (economics), reliability analysis (engineering).
106. See Bruce D. Meyer, Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells, 58
ECONOMETRICA 757, 762–66 (1990).
107. See Douglas W. Allen, Establishing Economic Property Rights by Giving Away an
Empire, 62 J.L. & ECON. 251 (2019).
108. See Aziz Z. Huq, The President and the Detainees, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 499 (2017).
109. See Fiona M. Kay, Stacie L. Alarie & Jones K. Adjei, Undermining Gender Equality:
Female Attrition from Private Law Practice, 50 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 766 (2016).
110. See Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public Versus
Private Law Enforcement from Bail Jumping, 47 J.L. & ECON. 93 (2004).
111. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An
Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1414 (2012).
112. Because of the paucity of breakpoints, we modified the typical Kaplan-Meier
functions by estimating slopes between observed breakpoints. We report the traditional
Kaplan-Meier results in the appendix. It assumes the survival function between breakpoints
to be constant and, therefore, shows declining horizontal steps rather than a slope. As the
number of observed breakpoints increases, the estimator would approach the true survival
function for the population.

1682

1683

The Million-Dollar Diversity Docket

could a case that would fail one jurisdictional amount be revived at
a higher amount.113
We begin with univariate analyses that describe the potential
impact of a raised jurisdictional amount in relation to a series of
factors under investigation. For example, we inquire whether the
pro se status of plaintiffs affect the jurisdictional amount analysis.
To do this, we measure the fraction of different types of cases that
satisfy increasing jurisdictional amounts.
This approach provides an intuitive and useful preliminary
overview. However, it is not well suited to describe the interaction
of multiple variables (e.g., pro se litigants suing in tort using
complex joinder).114 For example, imagine we compare tort and
contract cases and find significant differences in their sensibility to
raises in the amount in controversy. It would be difficult to know
whether this is due to differences in the subject matter or the fact
that, let’s say, pro se litigants crowd the tort docket but are largely
absent from the contract docket. Any differences in sensitivity to
AIC-changes might be due to subject matter, pro se status, or both.
Accordingly, univariate analyses that focus on the relationship of
sensitivity to jurisdictional amounts and any one factor are
inherently limited.
To overcome this limitation, we will utilize a Cox proportional
hazards regression analysis in section 3.H. The Cox regression
model provides a numerical survival analysis that can take into
account the simultaneous effects of multiple factors and provides
helpful measures of statistical reliability. In effect, the Cox model
allows us to tease out, in the above example, to what extend subject
matter differences are responsible for the AIC impact and to what
extent pro se status factors in.
D. Selection Effects, Limitations, and Caveats
In many other research contexts, a counter-factual approach
like ours would lead to selection effects and potentially misleading
findings. Litigants are strategic actors that dynamically adjust their

113. Hypothetically, remedies law could provide otherwise but we are not aware of
any such remedies laws, and they would be conceptually troublesome.
114. It is also limited to categorical factors under investigation and ill-suited for
continuous variables. However, given the structure of our data and the variables of most
interest to us this limitation is not significant in the context of this article.
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behavior in response to altered legal environments.115 For example,
it could be the case that litigants would systematically adjust the
relief section of their complaints in response to Congress raising the
jurisdictional amount.116 If that were the case, then our comparison
of the current stock of cases to the adjusted stock of future cases
would be misleading. Instead of continuing to file now
jurisdictionally deficient complaints into the teeth of a raised
jurisdictional amount, plaintiffs would simply adjust and craft
complaints to meet the new congressional guidelines. If that
were the case, a raised jurisdictional amount might impact the
current stock of complaints but would not present an obstacle for
future complaints.
However, we think this danger is remote. Selection effects are
likely not a significant factor in the amount in controversy context
for numerous reasons. First, actors out there in the world are
unlikely to significantly change their primary behavior in response
to Congress raising the jurisdictional amount (e.g., breaching more
contracts that fall below the jurisdictional amount because of the
unavailability of federal courts). Many people will not adjust their
behavior because they simply would not know the old or new
jurisdictional amount. Many of those that are aware of the amount
in controversy requirement will find that the benefits of
breach outweigh the risk of litigating in state court rather than
federal court.
Also, plaintiffs are unlikely to change how they write
complaints in response to a raised jurisdictional amount. Plaintiffs
who desire to be in federal court typically already claim as much as
they can.117 Put simply, those plaintiffs have many reasons to

115. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The ‘Twiqbal’ Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil
Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1223–24 (2013) (noting the dangers of failing to take into
account dynamic litigant responses); Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery?
Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2275–77
(2012) (discussing various selection effects in the context of pleading standards); Scott
Dodson, A Closer Look at New Pleading in the Litigation Marketplace, 99 JUDICATURE 11 (2015).
116. See, e.g., William H.J. Hubbard, The Effects of Twombly and Iqbal, 14 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 474 (2017) (presenting evidence that lawyers changed their pleading and
motion practice in the wake of changed pleading standards).
117. See generally William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading, 83 U. CHI.
L. REV. 693 (2016) (arguing that even in a world without pleading standards plaintiffs would
typically “file factually detailed, plausible complaints or [] not file at all.”).
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demand all available relief and few reasons to exclude.118 Plaintiffs
who filed in state court and wish to stay there often plead vaguely;
instead of specifying damages down to dollars and cents they often
plead generally (e.g., “slip-and-fall resulted in a broken arm”). For
these plaintiffs, raising the jurisdictional amount is not likely to
change their pleading practices because vagueness and generality
remain good strategies for keeping their cases in state court. Thus,
for both plaintiffs that want to litigate in federal court and those
that want to remain in state court, a raised jurisdictional amount
would likely not affect their pleading approaches. Insofar as this
claim is true for most plaintiffs, our approach allows for inferences
from the current stock of cases to a hypothetical future stock of
cases that plead under a raised jurisdictional amount. Insofar as the
above claim is not true, our inferences are not reliable.
Perhaps the highest danger of selection effects originates with
removing defendants. Defendants can also make their own amount
in controversy assertions in the removal notice.119 Defendants who
do so may feel conflicted. On the one hand, they have an incentive
to assert a high number in order to achieve the ultimate goal of
establishing that removal is proper. On the other hand, some
defendants may feel that placing a high value on the case is against
their ultimate interests as the party that might have to pay a
judgment. Thus, it is possible that defendants moderate their
amount in controversy assertions in their removal notices, trying to
strike a balance between signaling that the case exceeds the amount
threshold without acknowledging their full potential damages
exposure. If this is true, then there may be some cases in our
population in which the defendant asserted a value only high
enough to clear the current $75,000 threshold but could and would
have asserted a higher value had the threshold been higher. Should
Congress increase the amount in controversy requirement, these
defendants might be expected to ratchet up the values they assert
in their removal notices to clear the higher threshold. All of our
findings must be read with these caveats in mind.

118. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(3) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . .
a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types
of relief.”).
119. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(A).
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III. MAIN FINDINGS
Our overarching finding is that jurisdictional amounts are not
neutral throttles. They do not modulate all cases evenhandedly.
Instead, different areas of law, different parts of the country, and
different litigants are more affected by changes in the jurisdictional
amount than others. Thus, setting the amount in controversy at any
level entails normative choices about which cases to bless and curse
with a federal forum and which to shun. While our research is
focused on what would happen if Congress raised the jurisdictional
amount, lowering the jurisdictional amount would also lead to
differentiation. Alas, even a $0 amount in controversy requirement
entails a choice with differential impact.
The initial section of this Part looks at the effect of various
increases on the overall size of the diversity docket. The sections
that follow then aim to tease out the different ways in which the
jurisdictional amount impacts various parts of the federal docket.
We begin by examining how the various increases would affect the
five districts in our study. We then examine how the various
increases would affect cases based on their subject matter (tort cases
versus contract cases). Next, we examine the effect of the various
increases based on whether a case was originally filed in federal
court or removed. We then examine how the various increases
affect cases based on whether either of the parties is a resident of
the forum state. Next, we examine how the various increases affect
cases in which one of the parties (typically the plaintiff) was
proceeding pro se. Finally, we examine how the various increases
affect cases that eventually became part of an MDL.120
We want to stress three specific findings. First, increasing the
amount in controversy could create a significant but non-linear
decrease in the overall size of the diversity docket. Second, a change
in the required amount in controversy would have a disparate
impact across the country, with some districts being affected
roughly twice as much as others. And third, increasing the amount
in controversy would disproportionately impact removed cases,

120. We also examined party complexity and types of relief requested on an individual
basis. These figures did not strike us as suggesting sufficiently novel or interesting findings
to warrant separate treatment. To avoid clutter, we do not present these figures here but
included these variables in the Cox Model in section 3H.
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cases that eventually transfer to MDL proceedings, and cases with
pro se litigants.
The final section of this Part presents a Cox Proportional
Hazard Regression model that combines all of these variables
and provides for coefficient comparisons and measures of
statistical significance.
A. All Diversity Cases
We begin with an account of how raising the jurisdictional
amount would impact all diversity cases. Figure 3 presents a
modified Kaplan-Meier survival function where the horizontal axis
indicates progressively higher jurisdictional amounts, and the
vertical axis represents the percent of all diversity cases that would
survive such an amount.121 An unmodified Kaplan-Meier survival
function with confidence intervals is provided in Appendix A.
As explained above in section II.A, each black dot indicates one
breakpoint that we measured (at $75,000, $250,000, $500,000, and
$1 million). The black line indicates our best estimate between
these breakpoints.

121. The left vertical axis shows percentages relative to all cases. The right vertical axis
shows percentages relative to only those cases that meet the current amount in controversy
requirement of $75,000. As such, the left vertical axis can be used to approximate the
percentage of cases that survive at a given AIC point. The right vertical axis can be used
to approximate how much an increase from the current AIC would reduce the current
diversity docket.
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Figure 3: Overall AIC Modification Pass Rate

Figure 3 shows a significant but non-linear decline in the overall
size of the federal diversity docket.122 More than tripling the
122. The 1988 study found a similar impact. It estimated that an increase from $10,000
to $50,000 would eliminate 10.6% of the cases while 59.3% would clearly survive (with the
fate of the remaining 30.1% of the cases unclear). See Partridge, supra note 80, at 14.
Comparatively, increasing the amount from $10,000 to $100,000 would eliminate 14.5% of
the cases while 47.7% would clearly survive (with the fate of the remaining 37.8% of the cases
unclear). Id. at 17. Thus, the 1988 study also found that higher increases yielded diminishing
reductions. The 1951 study yields conflicting findings. It estimates that increasing the
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amount in controversy to $250,000 could reduce the diversity
docket by roughly 20% overall. Increasing the amount in
controversy to $1 million (a thirteen-fold increase) would still leave
more than half of the diversity docket intact. Most of the decline
occurs early on and then levels off. This suggests that Congress
could affect a significant decline in the federal diversity docket with
a modest increase in the jurisdictional amount. A greater increase
in the jurisdictional amount would have declining marginal effects.
However, these effects are not evenly distributed across all
types of cases. In the following sections we will analyze the federal
docket one facet at a time.
B. By District
We begin our facetted analysis by differentiating the overall
jurisdictional amount pass rates by district. Figure 4 replicates the
information of Figure 3 in the shape of the black line that indicates
the overall average pass rates. The grey lines indicate district-bydistrict pass rates. Again, Figure 4 is a modified Kaplan-Meier
survival function and Appendix B provides an unmodified version.

amount from $3,000 to $7,500 would eliminate 20% of the cases, raising it to $10,000 would
eliminate 24%, and raising it to $15,000 would eliminate 40%. See H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, supra
note 64, at 24 (1958). Thus, the marginal reduction appears to slow between $7,500 and
$10,000 and then speed up between $10,000 and $15,000. This result may be an artifact of the
study’s methodology, which valued cases according to the amount claimed by the plaintiff
rather than an estimate of the possible damages.
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Figure 4: AIC Modification Pass Rates Across Districts

Notes: The dots represent measured breakpoints; the lines represent estimated rates. The grey
line represents the complete dataset while each black line represents a different district.
Texas Northern is labeled mid-figure to avoid clutter (its endpoint very closely matches the
average line).

As Figure 4 makes clear, some districts are far more sensitive to
changes in the jurisdictional amount than others, with some
districts being affected roughly twice as much as others.123 Thus, in
123. The 1951 study also found that different districts would be affected differently.
Across all eighty-six districts, it estimated that increasing the amount in controversy from
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some states a raised jurisdictional amount would not significantly
affect the federal dockets while others might suddenly find much
of their diversity docket vanished. For some districts, that might
provide a welcome reduction to overcrowded dockets. For other
districts, it might leave judges with too little to do.124
These differential effects are likely the result of different
economic conditions, different dockets, and, perhaps, variation in
state damages law. This is a reminder that the federal civil docket
is not uniform across the country.125 Some districts simply have
more or less of some types of cases than other districts. It is also a
reminder that the federal diversity docket is shaped not only by
Congress (through, for example, setting various jurisdictional
amounts) and courts (through doctrines like the legal certainty test)
but also by the states (through their damages law).
C. By Subject
The next facetted analysis examines the impact of different
amount increases based on subject matter.126 Perhaps suits with
different underlying subject matters are more vulnerable to raises
in the jurisdictional amount than others. This could be the case for
various reasons. First, it is possible that some types of suits tend to
be more serious than others. Perhaps the average tort case, for
example, involves more serious misconduct with more serious
$3,000 to $7,500 would eliminate 6.1% of diversity cases. See H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, supra note
64, at 25 (1958) (Table 3). But that ranged from a low of 2% (District of Hawaii) to a high of
19.6% (Northern District of Texas).
124. Judges with light caseloads can add to them in different ways. Judges can serve as
visiting judges in overburdened districts. See 28 U.S.C. § 292(b) (assignment to different
district within the same circuit); 28 U.S.C. § 292(d) (assignment to a district in another circuit).
Judges can substantially add to their dockets without leaving their own courthouses by
agreeing to serve as an MDL transferee judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (district judge must
agree to accept transferee judge assignment). Because most MDL cases are diversity cases,
and because MDL cases are less affected by amount in controversy increases, accepting more
MDL assignments might have the ironic effect of raising the district’s diversity numbers back
up to the point where it was no longer a laggard.
125. See David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 317, 319 (1977) (proposing a “‘local option’ plan, under which each federal district
would have limited freedom to retain, curtail, or virtually eliminate diversity jurisdiction
within its borders.”).
126. The main subject matter of each case is identified in the FJC data. Alas, modern
joinder allows for suits that involve multiple subject matters. Thus, the FJC data is not a finetuned instrument. That being said, many of the diversity suits in our data set involved
relatively unified subject matters.
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consequences than the average contract case. Second, different
types of damages are available in different types of cases. For
example, punitive damages and damages for pain and suffering are
far more likely to be available in tort cases than in contract cases.
Thus, even if the seriousness of the misconduct is held constant, it
is possible that higher amount thresholds might affect tort damages
differently than contract damages. Third, the amount in
controversy determination is more difficult in some types of suits
than others.127 Finally, numerous states have subject-specific
damages laws that, typically, limit the available amount in
controversy for some types of suits. For example, many states have
implemented individualized damages caps for medical malpractice
suits. Such variation in damages law might affect the diversity
docket if Congress were to raise the jurisdictional amount because
complaints in those subject matters would fail under the legal
certainty test.
Figure 5 again includes a grey line that indicates the overall,
non-differentiated pass rates. It adds two black lines: one for tort
cases128 and one for contract cases.129 Of course, contract and tort
cases are not the only types of diversity cases, but they currently
constitute the brunt of the federal docket.

127. See, e.g., 14AA Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3707 (4th ed.) (“The application of the
legal certainty test to a tort claim lodged in a federal court on the basis of diversity of
citizenship in which the plaintiff alleges a small amount of actual damages, such as medical
expenses, and a large amount of unliquidated damages, usually involving pain and suffering
and a loss of future earnings, presents particularly difficult measurement problems.”); H.R.
REP. NO. 85-1706, supra note 64, at 1–30 (1958) (“[I]n tort cases the amount claimed oftentimes
bears little relation to the actual recovery.”).
128. Tort cases in the FJC data include torts to land, tort product liability, airplane
personal and product liability, assault, libel, slander, motor vehicle personal and product
liability, other personal injury, medical malpractice, personal injury and product liability,
health care and pharmacy related torts, as well as asbestos cases.
129. Contract cases in the FJC data include general contract cases, insurance cases,
contract product liability, and franchise cases.
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Figure 5: AIC Modification Pass Rates Comparing Tort Cases to
Contract Cases

Notes: The dots represent measured breakpoints; the lines represent estimated rates. The grey
line represents the complete dataset. A word of caution about interpreting these results: as
indicated above, these figures act on a single variable and do not take into account
simultaneous effects of multiple factors, and they do not indicate overall statistical reliability.
Section III.H will provide a better measure of statistical reliability.

Figure 5 suggests a significant variation between the
vulnerability of tort and contract cases. Raising the jurisdictional
amount would lead to a sharp drop-off in contract cases but a much
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milder reduction in tort cases.130 This suggests that a raise in the
jurisdictional amount would significantly reshuffle the mix of
subject matter before federal courts.
The fact that tort and contract cases would fare differently
under higher amount thresholds is not inherently problematic.131
Congress is free to give tort cases privileged access to federal court
compared to contract cases.132 If Congress wishes to use the amount
in controversy threshold to achieve that goal indirectly, it certainly
may do so. Our purpose is only to point out that higher increases
will favor tort cases over contract cases, leaving it to Congress to
decide what to do with that information.133

130. Our findings align with two earlier studies estimating the expected impact of
increases to the amount in controversy requirement. See Partridge, supra note 80, at 15–16
(finding that an increase from $10,000 to $100,000 would eliminate 43.9% of contract cases
but only 4.3% of tort cases); H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, supra note 64, at 20 (finding that an
increase from $3,000 to $10,000 would eliminate 39% of contract cases but only 13% of
tort cases).
131. Another layer of potential concern is, of course, the composition of the re-shuffled
tort and contract dockets. As discussed later (see infra section 3.G), surviving tort cases are
dominated by MDL cases at the higher breakpoints, suggesting that no longer viable tort
cases are of the more quotidian variety. Though beyond our data, we suspect that the reshuffled contract docket would include fewer suits by and against individuals, leaving
mostly inter-business suits.
132. The Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act, for example, provides a special
pathway into the federal courts for lawsuits based on accidents in which 75 or more persons
died. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a).
133. While federal procedure generally (but not always) follows what is known as the
“trans-substantivity” norm, in which the same rules apply to all cases regardless of subject
matter, we do not think that norm is implicated in these circumstances. See generally David
Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59
DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 372 (2010) (“The trans-substantivity principle reduces complexity for a
straightforward reason. It requires that the procedural treatment that the Federal Rules
prescribe for simple contracts disputes mirrors exactly what applies in complicated
employment discrimination litigation.”). First, an across-the-board increase to the amount
threshold would follow that norm, not deviate from it. Second, even if Congress were to
enact different jurisdictional standards for tort and contract cases, we do not think that
would transgress the trans-substantivity norm as it is commonly understood. The concept of
procedural trans-substantivity is typically associated with court rulemaking. One of the main
arguments for having a single set of rules applicable to all cases is that creating different rules
for different types of cases is a matter of substance and politics that should be left to
Congress. See Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J.
669, 704 (2010). While it is true that trans-substantivity has other benefits—for example,
lessons learned in one type of case can be applied in others, see id., the primary justification
for it is not violated when it is in fact Congress that picks the substantive winners and losers.
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D. By Origin
Our next univariate comparison is focused on the origin of a
case: was it originally filed in federal court or removed from state
court? In many ways, filing plaintiffs and removing defendants are
similarly situated when they invoke federal subject matter
jurisdiction.134 But an important tension lingers between the norm
that plaintiffs are masters of their own suits and that defendants
can also invoke the protection of federal courts.135 In recent years,
endless litigation and significant statute-drafting has centered on
the interplay of these norms. Figure 6 explores how originally filed
actions and removed actions would fare if Congress were to raise
the jurisdictional amount.

134. See, e.g., Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 88 (2014)
(arguing that it would be “anomalous to treat commencing plaintiffs and removing
defendants differently with regard to the amount in controversy”); McPhail v. Deere & Co.,
529 F.3d 947, 953 (10th Cir. 2008) (requiring proof by defendant but not by plaintiff “bears no
evident logical relationship either to the purpose of diversity jurisdiction, or to the principle
that those who seek to invoke federal jurisdiction must establish its prerequisites”).
135. See generally Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between
State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769,
1775–78 (1992).
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Figure 6: AIC Modification Pass Rates by Origin

The gap between these lines is striking (and, as we will see in
section 3.H, highly statistically significant). A modest increase in
the jurisdictional amount would affect cases filed originally in
federal court almost as much as it would affect removed cases.
However, at higher levels, their fates would depart. At the extreme
$1 million level, more than 60% of the current stock of federal
diversity cases originally filed in federal court would still be there.
In contrast, only one in four removed cases would still remain on
the federal docket.
What explains this surprising finding? Perhaps plaintiffs are
preemptively filing their removal-eligible big cases in federal court,
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anticipating that removal would be inevitable, to be able to select
their preferred federal forum.136 Perhaps plaintiffs do more in their
larger cases to structurally block removal (for example, by joining
a non-diverse co-party or by suing in the defendant’s home state)
than they do in their smaller cases.137 Conversely, perhaps plaintiffs
are deliberately structuring their larger cases (for example, by
excluding potential non-diverse co-parties) to secure access to
federal court. Our data show only that there are comparatively more
“big” cases in the original jurisdiction bucket than there are in the
removal bucket. But they do not explain why that might be so.
Another possibility is that the materials we used to code the
cases do not accurately signal the full potential value of the cases in
the removal bucket. As discussed above,138 while plaintiffs filing
originally in federal court have no incentive to downplay their
damage claims (and would seem to have every incentive to
maximize them), plaintiffs who file in state court have an incentive
to conceal their true damages to potentially thwart removal. Thus,
in the removed cases in our dataset, the state-court complaints
might understate the damages potentially in controversy. To
counteract that, removing defendants are permitted to include their
own assertions about the amount in controversy in their removal
notices.139 Removing defendants have every incentive to show that
the amount in controversy exceeds the current $75,000 threshold.
But removing defendants currently have no incentive to show that
the amount in controversy exceeds any of the higher breakpoints in
our study. Indeed, some removing defendants might deliberately

136. A plaintiff from State A, for example, might prefer State Court A to State Court B,
but prefer the federal courts in State B to either State Court B or federal courts in State A. If
the plaintiff files in State Court A and the case is removed, it would be removed to federal
court in State A and the plaintiff would need to successfully move to transfer to get to the
case to federal court in State B. If the plaintiff files in State B (home of the defendant), the
case would remain there because the forum defendant rule would bar an attempt at removal.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). Thus, if the plaintiff perceives removal to be likely, the plaintiff
might rationally file in federal court in State B to ensure getting its second favorite forum
and avoid the risk of the case ending up in one of its two disfavored forums (State Court B
or federal court in State A).
137. Joining a non-diverse co-party prevents removal by destroying complete diversity.
See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). Even if complete diversity exists, the plaintiff
can block removal via the “forum defendant rule” by suing in the defendant’s home state.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).
138. See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
139. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2).
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temper their pricing to avoid suggesting that a case approaches
the $1 million mark (which, alas, is against the defendant’s
ultimate interests).
To mirror what federal judges do in practice, we instructed our
RAs to consider both the plaintiff’s state-court complaint and the
defendant’s removal notice.140 We recognize, however, that the
unique setting of removal gives neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant an incentive to be fully candid about the entire range and
measure of damages potentially in controversy above the current
$75,000 threshold. To the extent this occurred in our study sample
of cases,141 our data underestimates the number of removed cases
likely to have passed at the higher breakpoints. Thus, if Congress
were to enact those higher breakpoints, giving removing
defendants the full incentive to make assertions to meet them,
those pass rates might increase, reducing the disparity captured in
our data.
With that caveat in mind, our data suggest that a modest change
in the jurisdictional amount would do little to affect the mix of
direct filed and removed federal diversity cases. However, raising
the jurisdictional amount dramatically might significantly reduce
the number of removed cases compared to originally filed cases.
We leave it to Congress to decide whether that result would be
normatively desirable or not. Alternatively, if Congress wanted to
keep a consistent mix of federal diversity cases and raise the
jurisdictional amount significantly, then this would require
concurrent adjustments to federal removal statutes and doctrines.
E. By Residency
We next turn to examine the likely effects of a raised
jurisdictional amount on forum residents and non-residents. The
reason for this focus is the raison d’être of diversity jurisdiction,
140. The amount in controversy can be satisfied by either the sum demanded in good
faith in the plaintiff’s complaint or an amount asserted in the defendant’s removal notice. Id.
141. We have no way of knowing whether this phenomenon exists, how widespread it
might be, or how much it might lead defendants to understate amounts potentially in
controversy. While our impression of the removal notices we read leads us to think that
defendants are generally not pulling their punches on how much might be at stake—for
example, we saw no evidence that defendants were describing wrongful death suits as mere
“$100,000” cases—we acknowledge the possibility that defendants might be reluctant to
affirmatively describe cases as “$1 million” cases, or might fail to mention potential damages
that could tip a case from a $200,000 to a $300,000 case.
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traditionally explained as protecting out-of-state litigants from
local prejudice.142 While local prejudice is difficult to define143 or
study,144 we wanted to contribute to this debate by probing how a
raised jurisdictional amount would re-shuffle resident and nonresident litigants in the federal diversity docket. Figure 7
distinguishes between suits where only the plaintiff is from the
forum, where only the defendant is from the forum, and where
neither party is from the forum.145

142. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 24, at 280–93; Graham C. Lilly, Making Sense of
Nonsense: Reforming Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 IND. L.J. 181, 190 (1998) (“[T]he principal
argument for diversity jurisdiction is the protection of out-of-state litigants from local
prejudice.”); Douglas D. McFarland, Diversity Jurisdiction: Is Local Prejudice Feared?, 7 LITIG.
38, 39 (1980) (“The only substantial argument favoring diversity jurisdiction is the original
one: it allays fear of local prejudice.”).
143. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U.
L.Q. 119, 137 (2003) (“The term ‘local bias’ is used in the legal literature regularly without
definition, thereby assuming that readers understand its meaning.”).
144. See, e.g., Jerry Goldman & Kenneth S. Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction and Local Bias: A
Preliminary Empirical Inquiry, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 94 (1980) (“The actual existence of local
prejudice is difficult to uncover, and thus survey research must be content with an
examination of the perception of such prejudice by attorneys.”).
145. This categorization reflects, in part, the concerns embedded in the removal statute.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (“A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the
jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action
is brought.”). Others might want to further sub-divide non-forum litigants into domestic and
foreign categories. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in
American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. (1996).
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Figure 7: AIC Modification Pass Rates by Residency

Notes: To avoid confusion, we suppressed from this figure a few cases where the data
indicated that both litigants were at home in the district. Presumably, cases in this category
would fail based on a lack of complete diversity of citizenship at any jurisdictional amount.
Also, please note that the FJC data from which resident information is derived relies here on
party submissions that might reflect their views and aspirations more than reality.

Figure 7 suggests that raising the jurisdictional amount would
most reduce cases where the plaintiff is litigating in her home state.
It will have less of an impact on cases where the defendant is
litigating at home and least where neither party is at home. Please
note, however, that these differences, once we control for additional
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variables, are not statistically significant.146 Thus, while the
categories of litigants show different susceptibility to raised
jurisdictional amounts, other co-varying variables better explain
such differences.
To the extent higher amount requirements suppress diversity
cases in which the plaintiff files in federal court in its home state,
many would see that as a normatively positive side effect. Diversity
jurisdiction reformers have long called for Congress to eliminate
so-called “in-state plaintiff” diversity jurisdiction.147 First, the
standard “outsider bias” justification for diversity jurisdiction does
not apply when a plaintiff is the one to invoke federal jurisdiction
in its home state.148 Second, permitting plaintiffs to file diversity
cases in their homes states places plaintiffs in a privileged position
compared to defendants, who are barred by the forum-defendant
rule from removing cases from their own home states on the
grounds that they are not at risk of local prejudice.149 While
Congress could level the playing field by eliminating the forumdefendant rule,150 most reformers have proposed that Congress
extend the “no risk of local prejudice” concept to plaintiffs and bar
plaintiffs from invoking diversity jurisdiction in their home states.

146. See infra section III.H.
147. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 123–25 (1968) [hereinafter ALI 1968 STUDY] (proposing
elimination of in-state plaintiff diversity); FCSC REPORT, supra note 55, at 42 (generally
proposing to eliminate diversity jurisdiction completely but offering the elimination of instate diversity as a back-up proposal); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG
RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 30 (Dec. 1995) (proposing elimination of in-state
plaintiff diversity).
148. See ALI 1968 STUDY, supra note 147, at 124 (“The right of an in-state plaintiff to
institute a diversity action against an out-of-state defendant . . . is not responsive to any
acceptable justification for diversity jurisdiction. The in-stater can hardly be heard to ask the
federal government to spare him from litigation in the courts of his own state. Any prejudice
which he may fear is not of the kind against which diversity jurisdiction was intended to
protect.”); FSCS REPORT, supra note 55, at 42 (“The only colorable argument supporting
diversity jurisdiction—fear of state court bias against out-of-state litigants—has no force
when in-state plaintiffs invoke it.”).
149. See 16 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.55[1], at 107–08 (2020) (“The justification
for the forum defendant rule is simple. The purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to provide
litigants with an unbiased forum by protecting out-of-state litigants from local prejudice.
Therefore, it makes no sense to allow an in-state defendant to take advantage of removal on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction.”).
150. See Dodson, supra note 24, at 315.
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F. By Pro Se
One important consideration when contemplating a raise of the
jurisdictional amount is the impact of such a move on vulnerable
litigants. The protection and advantages of federal courts should be
open to all types of litigants, from the most well-resourced and
experienced institution to the most destitute one-time litigant.151
Beyond even-handedness, there are also institutional reasons to
insist on a diverse pool of litigants. Courts and legal developments
are shaped by the character and arguments of litigants. If
vulnerable and poor litigants are systematically shut out of federal
courts, then it will predictably be more difficult for federal judges
to gain experience with their plight.
Vulnerability is a difficult concept to measure and operationalize.
Here we use the crude proxy of pro se status.152 An alternative or
additional proxy could be in forma pauperis status (“IFP”) but
there are too few instances in our dataset to make reasonably
reliable claims based on IFP status.

151. Of course, not all pro se litigants desire to be in federal court.
152. Defined here as cases with at least one pro se litigant. Often that is the plaintiff,
sometimes a defendant, and, very rarely, both. Not all pro se litigants are poor, of course.
But they are likely poorer than litigants who hire attorneys.
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Figure 8: AIC Modification Pass Rates for Pro Se Cases

As Figure 8 shows, an increase in the amount in controversy
would affect pro se cases far more than non-pro se cases. Thus, an
increase in the jurisdictional amount would reduce the percentage
of the overall federal docket that contains pro se litigants. Insofar
as these litigants present judges with different arguments,
perspectives, and challenges, this would limit the exposure of
federal courts in diversity cases to a diverse set of views.
Our data set does not allow us to explain why pro se cases drop
off so sharply at the higher amount in controversy breakpoints. Many
pro se cases are brought by prisoners. We suspect, however, that most
prisoner suits are brought under federal question jurisdiction. To the
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extent prisoners are filing pro se diversity actions,153 it seems
reasonable to assume that prisoners engage in fewer activities that
might lead to high-value diversity suits (e.g., large commercial
transactions or serious car accidents).154 For non-prisoner pro se
litigants, the most likely explanation is probably brute economics.
Litigants generally willing to take the “do it yourself” route in their
small value cases might feel the need for expert assistance in their
highest value cases. And as the value of a case increases, so too does
the incentive for an attorney to take it. Thus, the drop-off in
high-value pro se cases may simply reflect the reality that it is easier
to find a lawyer to take on a high-value weak case than a
low-value one.
G. By Multi-District Litigation (“MDL”)
The next type of case we examine is multi-district litigation
(“MDL”): cases transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 for coordinated
or consolidated pretrial proceedings. As is by now well-known,
multi-district litigation takes up a sizable chunk of the federal
docket in general and the federal diversity docket specifically. Not
only are these types of cases numerous, but they also include many
high-profile proceedings155 like the national opiate litigation.156
MDL proceedings also stand out because they frequently utilize
“unorthodox procedures” not typically found in other cases.157
Most of the academic work that documents the departures of MDL
procedures from those utilized in non-MDL cases has focused on
the manner of litigation during and post-transfer. We observed in
our dataset another type of departure: loose and irregular pleading.
Numerous complaints in cases predictably destined for MDLproceedings that were already ongoing (so called “tag-along”
153. Generally, a prisoner does not acquire a new domicile upon incarceration. See
generally 15A MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 102.37[8] (2019 ed.).
154. While prisoners sometimes suffer significant personal injuries while incarcerated,
those claims are typically brought as civil rights claims under federal question jurisdiction.
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
155. Alas, not all MDL cases are high-profile or far-reaching. See generally Zachary D.
Clopton, MDL as Category, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1297 (2020).
156. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio 2019).
See generally Roger Michalski, MDL Immunity: Lessons from the National Prescription Opiate
Litigation, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 175 (2019).
157. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict
Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669 (2017).
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cases) did not utilize traditional complaints but used stream-lined
short-forms instead.158 We were curious if all of these differences
between MDL and non-MDL cases mattered in the context of
establishing diversity jurisdiction.

158. When short-form complaints are used, the details of the plaintiff’s individual
circumstances are often provided by having the plaintiffs fill out “fact sheets” using
protocols developed by the parties and the court. See MARGARET S. WILLIAMS, JASON.
CANTONE & EMERY G. LEE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PLAINTIFF FACT SHEETS IN
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION PROCEEDINGS: A GUIDE FOR TRANSFEREE JUDGES (2019)
(“Pocket Guide” co-developed by the Federal Judicial Center and the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation).
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Figure 9: AIC Modification Pass Rates in MDL Cases

Figure 9 shows the significant gap between the vulnerability of
non-MDL cases and MDL cases. Initially small, the gap continues
to widen dramatically after the quarter-million-dollar mark. While
raising the jurisdictional amount past that point would barely affect
MDL cases, non-MDL cases continue to drop off sharply. Figure 9
suggests that raising the jurisdictional amount modestly would
increase the percentage of MDL cases on the federal docket
modestly while a significant increase in the jurisdictional amount
would drastically accelerate the conquest of the federal docket by
MDL proceedings. Since MDL proceedings are handled by a single
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judge and can contain hundreds or thousands of cases, a large
increase in the jurisdictional amount would mean many non-MDL
judges would see their diversity docket sharply reduced.
What explains why MDLs initially drop off at the $250,000
breakpoint but then mostly hold steady through increases at
$500,000 and $1 million? One possible explanation is that our data
might be sorting MDL plaintiffs with manifested injuries from
those who were exposed but remain largely asymptomatic. Many
MDLs are mass product liability actions against drug companies or
the makers of medical products. Some MDL plaintiffs are alleged
to have suffered severe injuries or even died from exposure to the
product in question. Those plaintiffs will easily clear any amount
threshold up through $1 million. That insight likely explains why
MDL cases are comparatively immune to amount in controversy
increases; the types of product liability cases that often become
aggregated via MDL are, as a category, high-value cases because
they often involve severe or long-term injuries triggering the
possibility of significant economic and noneconomic damages. But
other MDL plaintiffs exposed to the product may have yet to
manifest any of the severe injuries alleged to potentially result from
exposure to the product. The drop-off between $75,000
and $250,000 may reflect our coders’ conclusion that plaintiffs who
have yet to suffer from those severe injuries have claims large
enough to get into federal court but not warranting present
significant damages.
The use of short-form complaints may also play a role. A typical
short-form MDL complaint provides plaintiffs with a list of claims
that might be asserted and injuries that might have been sustained,
with the plaintiff then checking the applicable boxes. Plaintiffs are
not asked to describe their individual damages in detail and little
space is provided for someone to do so. Those details will come
later, often via a fact sheet. The net result is that short-form
complaints provide a very thin basis on which to ascertain the
amount potentially recoverable. In some cases, the thin record does
not matter, for example when the short-form complaint shows that
the MDL plaintiff died or had a heart attack. In other cases, such as
when a plaintiff checks a box next to a term like “long-term kidney
disease,” the lack of further information about what that actually
means may have driven our coders—dutifully following the legal
certainty test—to code those cases higher than what they might
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have done had the plaintiffs been required to provide the
particulars of their claimed injuries.
Figure 9 also contains another lesson: while a raise in the
jurisdictional amount would take some cases out of MDL
proceedings, many nation-wide MDLs based on state-law causes of
action would continue to be viable.159 The JPML can only transfer
cases under § 1407 that are already in federal court; it does not have
the power to transfer state-court actions. Only cases filed in federal
court or removed to federal court can be transferred under § 1407.
Insofar as MDL coordination is desirable, Figure 9 shows that there
is only a small risk that a raise in the jurisdictional amount would
have the unintended effect of depriving MDL proceedings of the
currently deep reach into state courts.
H. Cox Model
Each of the previous sections explored one variable in turn. This
section summarizes and extends this discussion by examining the
simultaneous effects of multiple variables at the same time and by
measuring statistical significance. Given how under-theorized and
under-tested this area of inquiry is, we utilized a broad range of
variables of interest to construct a broad specification. Future
studies might want to isolate specific areas of inquiry and consider
the information value of each variable in isolation and in
combination with other groups of variables to construct more
focused models.
Table 3 presents our initial set of Cox model specifications.160 We
report hazard ratios (“HR”) rather than Cox coefficients for ease of
interpretation.161 A hazard ratio of 1 represents the baseline.162
Hazard ratios below 1 signify a lower risk of dismissal. For
example, a hazard ratio of 0.6 for MDL membership indicates that
cases that were transferred under 28 USC § 1407 are associated with

159. See generally Dodson, supra note 24, at 267 (emphasizing the role of diversity
jurisdiction in facilitating multistate aggregation); FCSC REPORT, supra note 55, at 38
(“Congress should limit federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship to complex
multi-state litigation, interpleader, and suits involving aliens.”).
160. We satisfactorily tested key aspects of the full model: proportional hazard
assumptions, nonlinearity in the relationship between the log hazard and covariates, and
testing for outliers that are unduly influential and drive the model.
161. Given a Cox regression parameter β, the hazard ratio is: HR = 𝑒 ! .
162. For β = 0, 𝑒 ! = 1.
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a 40 percent lower risk of dismissal at any given moment as
compared to similar cases that are not part of an MDL proceeding.
Conversely, hazard ratios above 1 signify a higher risk of dismissal.
For example, a hazard ratio of 1.23 for pro se cases indicates that
cases with at least one pro se litigant are associated with a 23
percent higher risk of dismissal at any given moment as compared
to similar cases that did not include a pro se litigant.
Table 3: Cox Proportional Hazard Regression Models (Reporting
Hazard Ratios)
(1)
Baseline

(2)
Districts

(3)
Remedies

(4)
Complexity

(5) All
Controls

Case Removed

1.81***
(10.68)

1.78***
(10.21)

0.62***
(11.19)

1.36***
(5.17)

1.38***
(4.84)

Subject Matter:
Torts

0.80**
(-2.94)

0.82**
(-2.63)

0.83.
(-1.84)

1.16.
(1.84)

1.11
(1.06)

Subject Matter:
Contract

1.31***
(3.49)

1.38***
(3.55)

1.15.
(1.654)

1.24**
(2.751)

1.17.
(1.85)

District:
Georgia N.
(baseline)

---

---

Minnesota

0.77
(-4.75)

0.66***
(-6.05)

New Jersey

0.90.
(-1.77)

0.92
(-1.34)

Texas N.

0.83*
(-2.00)

0.79**
(-2.63)

Utah

0.86.
(-1.95)

0.67***
(-4.57)

Relief
Requested:
Economic
Damages
Noneconomic
Punitive
Injunctive

0.81.
(-1.77)

0.93
(-0.57)

0.78**
(-2.81)

0.88
(-1.44)

0.81***
(-4.697)

0.68***
(-6.95)

0.89
(-1.35)

0.89
(-1.42)

1709

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Declaratory

47:6 (2022)

0.75***
(-3.67)

0.77***
(-3.31)

MDL

0.55***
(-9.72)

0.60***
(-6.70)

Party
Complexity

0.90***
(-4.15)

0.92**
(-3.04)

Pro Se Litigant
Plaintiff is a
Corporation

1.23*
(2.20)
0.93
(-0.95)

Defendant is a
Corporation
Plaintiff from
Forum

1.01
(0.23)
1.04
(0.64)

Defendant from
Forum

1.05
(0.76)

Notes: The parenthesis report z statistics. Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1
‘ ‘ 1. Because every case must be in a district, one district must serve as the baseline for the
model (no case can be without district). In this model, that baseline district is Georgia
Northern. The coefficients for the other districts are thus with reference to the Georgia
district. Any other district could also have served as a baseline (and the coefficients would
have adjusted with reference to the new baseline district).

Table 3 helps to identify variables that are statistically significant
and those that are not. Notably, the identity of the district, whether
a case was removed to or originally filed in federal court, party
complexity, some types of relief requested, pro se status, and
whether the case was part of an MDL are all statistically
significant.163 Once we control for those items, however, other
variables like residency and corporate status are not statistically
significant. Most notably, forum residency is not statistically
significant in Model 5 with all controls. This is surprising given the
centrality of forum residency to the diversity jurisdiction status,
case law, and academic debates. Similarly, the subject matter of the
suit, while statistically significant in the initial model, is not
statistically significant once we can control for additional factors,
most notably MDL status. Importantly, the lion’s share of MDL
163. Pro se status is only of mild statistical significance, likely due to the low
number of cases. We suspect, without knowing, that even a moderately larger sample size
that captured more pro se cases would show a drastic substantive effect on the
statistical significance.
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cases in our study are tort cases. Thus, the controlled analysis
suggests that the reason contract cases drop off more sharply than
tort cases at the higher breakpoints is because the MDL component
of the diversity tort docket is comparatively immune to amount
increases (at least up to the $1 million mark). Conversely,
geographic factors are initially not statistically significant (Model 2)
but once we control for additional variables geographic measures
become more fine-tuned and statistically significant.
Turning to substantive significance, the variables that show the
biggest substantive sensitivity to modifications of the jurisdictional
amount are removal, MDL status, and request of punitive damages
(holding all other covariates constant). If Congress were to raise the
jurisdictional amount, this is where we would expect to see the
biggest changes in the federal docket. Far more of the cases
currently removed, outside of MDL proceedings, and without
punitive damages requests would stay in state courts. Similarly,
pro se litigants would become rarer on the diversity docket.
Modifications of the diversity docket would also be unevenly
distributed around the country, with some districts seeing a much
greater diminution of their diversity dockets than others.
Figure 10 graphically reproduces these statistical and
substantive significance findings.
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Figure 10:
Removed
Torts
Contract
District: Minnesota
District: New Jersey
District: Texas N.
District: Utah
MDL
Pro Se
Party Complexity
Plaintiff from Forum
Defendant from Forum
Relief Requested: Economic
Damages
Relief Requested: Non-Economic
Relief Requested: Punitive
Relief Requested: Injunctive
Relief Requested: Declaratory
Plaintiff is a Corporation
Defendant is a Corporation

Notes: As in Table 3, Georgia N. serves as the baseline district.
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Each variable is represented by a black square. The horizontal
scale represents hazard ratios. The further variables are removed
from the baseline of 1 (the dotted vertical line) the more substantive
effect they have.164 Variables to the right of the dotted line (i.e.,
those greater than 1) indicate an increased risk of dismissal.
Variables to the left of the dotted line (i.e., those smaller than 1)
indicate a reduced risk of dismissal. The whiskers extending
from the black squares indicate confidence levels. Variables
whose confidence levels include or cross the baseline are not
statistically significant.165
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Whether to raise the amount in controversy threshold, leave it
in place, or even lower it is a matter for Congress. What insights or
lessons do our data provide to assist Congress in that endeavor?
We first recap our major findings. We then discuss several
implications for legislative reform.
A. Recap of Major Findings
Increasing the amount in controversy inevitably reduces the
number of cases eligible for diversity jurisdiction. But by how
much? Our data show that the reduction would be neither extreme
nor linear. Increasing the amount in controversy to $250,000 (3.3
times its current amount) would likely eliminate about 20% of the
diversity docket. Increasing it to $500,000 (6.6 times its current
amount) would only eliminate about 33% of the diversity docket.
And increasing it to $1 million (over 13 times its current
amount), would likely eliminate only about 40% of the current
diversity docket.
Two lessons for Congress seem clear. The first is that Congress
can make a dent in the size of the diversity docket by increasing the
amount in controversy. A 20% reduction is nothing to sneeze at.
Second, further increases yield diminishing reductions. Bigger
dents require increasingly bigger swings. And even increasing the
164. Comparison is streamlined because we utilize only indicator independent
variables instead of continuous variables (except for party complexity which is divided into
multiple buckets of complexity).
165. In other words, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the Cox regression parameter
is 0 (as a regression parameter of 0 would produce a hazard ratio of 1).
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amount in controversy over thirteen-fold to $1 million would still
leave over half of the diversity docket intact. By that measure, we
already have a million-dollar diversity docket.
Our data also show that increasing the amount threshold is not
a neutral throttle. We expected this intuitively, and prior studies
had indicated differential effects on contract cases compared to tort
cases.166 Our data confirm those subject-matter effects. Tort cases
would fare better at all amount thresholds, with the advantage
reaching roughly two-to-one at the $1 million mark. Our study also
provides new data on other differential effects. Some districts are
more affected than others. The MDL docket would fare
comparatively well. Pro se litigants would not. Comparatively
fewer cases would be removed or be filed originally in federal court
by plaintiffs in their home states. So, as the diversity docket shrinks,
its profile also changes. The million-dollar diversity docket
is necessarily a subset of the current one, but it is not a
representative one.
B. Inflation Adjustment
Inflation has taken a big bite out of the $75,000 amount
threshold in the twenty-five years since 1996. In 1996 dollars,
diversity jurisdiction is now available for cases worth about $45,000
today—roughly a 40% discount.
As a result, the diversity docket is assuredly different today
than it was in 1996. It is logically inescapable that there is some set
of cases that are worth $75,000 in today’s dollars that would not
have been worth $75,000 in 1996. We have every reason to believe
that the profile of cases in this amount in controversy band is
different than is found at higher amount thresholds (though we are
reluctant to speculate on what those specific differences might be).
The main point is that thanks to inflation, today’s diversity docket
is certainly bigger and very likely contains a different mix of cases
than the 1996 diversity docket.
Whether to extend diversity jurisdiction to this set of cases is a
matter of jurisdictional policy for Congress. If Congress were to
debate the impacts of inflation since 1996 and decide that it liked
having these additional lower-stakes cases in federal court, it could
certainly do that. But Congress has not had that discussion.
166. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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This new cohort of cases is eligible for diversity jurisdiction only
because Congress has not given the matter any thought. It is a result
of inaction, not choice.
To be sure, inflation adjustment is itself a policy choice. When
Congress adjusts the amount in controversy to keep up with
inflation, it ratifies the policy judgment that went into setting those
earlier stakes. But when Congress doesn’t adjust for inflation, it
allows the judicial federalism balance to change by default. Thus,
the reality is that Congress effectively makes jurisdictional policy
whether it accounts for inflation or not. Our view is that inattention
should not be the mechanism for altering the allocation of state-law
cases between the state and federal courts. For that reason, we think
that periodic adjustments are Congress’s responsibility unless and
until Congress elects to revisit the question of what that balance
should be.
From that position, we think the argument for an increase to
$125,000 or $150,000 to adjust for inflation is strong. To restore the
relative value of the 1996 $75,000 threshold, and to restore the mix
of cases associated with that value, Congress would need to
increase the amount in controversy to about $125,000. When
Congress has made earlier inflation adjustments, it has sometimes
added some cushion to account for expected future inflation.167 If
Congress wanted to follow that approach again, a doubling of the
amount in controversy to $150,000 would be warranted.
C. Indexing
If one believes that Congress has a duty to make periodic
inflation adjustments, the question then becomes when and how
Congress should do it. Congress could discharge its duty by
affirmatively revisiting the need for an inflation adjustment at
regular intervals. For example, in 1996 it made an inflation
adjustment only eight years after the 1988 increase. But the average
interval has been twenty-eight years,168 and the current interval is
at twenty-five years and counting. We are not optimistic that
Congress will stay on top of the matter through the normal ebb and
flow of jurisdictional legislation.

167. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
168. See supra Table 1, and accompanying text.

1715

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:6 (2022)

One rather obvious solution would be for Congress to pass
legislation that provided for automatic increases indexed to the
inflation rate. The Judicial Conference has supported indexing
since 1990, when it adopted an indexing recommendation made by
the Federal Courts Study Committee.169 The closest that
recommendation has come to being implemented was in 2009,
when an indexing proposal was included in the original House bill
of what became the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue
Clarification Act of 2010.170 That proposal called for indexing to
occur every five years (starting on January 1, 2011) with the amount
to be adjusted to the nearest $5,000.171 The proposal did not make it
into the version of the bill Congress eventually passed.172
While we support the concept of indexing, we don’t think that
the effects of inflation warrant indexing on an annual or even a fiveyear basis.173 The point of indexing is to create a mechanism that
prevents long-term Congressional inaction from effectively altering
diversity policy. The goal is not to ensure that the amount threshold
is always tuned to perfection but to avoid the large effects when the
gaps between updating extend into decades. We also are wary of
small increment adjustments because they are unlikely to make any
discernable difference. Given the uncertainty of the valuation
process, we suspect that a $5,000 increase would do little more
than create work for those of us who write (and update) books on
federal procedure.174

169. See FCSC REPORT, supra note 55, at 42 (proposing indexing); JCUS-SEP 90, supra
note 77, at 60 (adopting recommendation).
170. H.R. 4113, 111th Cong. (2010).
171. Id.
172. The provision drew opposition because, under this particular proposal, the
Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts would have published upcoming
increases in the Federal Register, but they would not then appear in the text of the section
1332. Critics complained that it would be confusing for litigants and attorneys to have to
consult a secondary source to determine the details of a statutory requirement.
173. One academic proposal calls for the amount to be updated every year. See Nina
Mohebbi, Craig Reiser & Samuel Greenburg, A Dynamic Formula for the Amount in
Controversy, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 10–13 (2014) (proposing that the amount in controversy
requirement be indexed annually based on a formula that incorporates inflation and
judicial workloads).
174. See Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial Rulemaking, 107
NW. U. L. REV. 447, 468–73 (2013) (criticizing the practice of making small and insignificant
changes and lamenting that doing so imposes costs including the need to revise treatises
and casebooks).
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We tentatively suggest that indexing would work better as a
decennial exercise with increases made in increments of no less
than $25,000. Doing so should avoid extreme erosion of the amount
threshold without yielding changes that come across as
meaningless tinkering. In that sense, the role we imagine for
indexing is to serve as a backstop. Congress is free to pay closer and
more frequent attention. But if it doesn’t, decennial indexing
should keep the scheme from getting too far out of kilter.
D. “Real Stakes” Increases
Our findings also have important implications for possible
increases beyond what is needed to account for inflation. Our data
show that the reductions to the diversity docket diminish as the
increases grow larger. At the same time, the larger increases have
worrisome side-effects in the form of escalating disparate impacts
on different subject matters, districts, and pro se litigants. If one
views the case reduction as the benefit and the differential impact
as a cost, then increases to the higher amounts impose escalating
costs for diminishing returns.
Would any real stakes increases be in order? Using the amount
in controversy to shrink the size of the diversity docket would not
be unprecedented. Most notably, Congress did it in 1888 to reduce
the burden on overworked federal judges and give them more time
and resources for the new and growing federal question docket.
Our study does not address whether any similar circumstances
exist today.
Our data, however, are helpful in that they provide Congress
with an estimate of the impact of any amount in controversy
increases so that Congress can make an informed decision as it
considers various policy goals. Our data show that, compared to
“big swing” increases, more modest increases yield more “bang for
the buck”—proportionally greater reduction—with less dramatic
side effects. Thus, Congress arguably could view a change to
$250,000 as triggering only the question of whether a reduction in
the size of the diversity docket is warranted, without having to
tackle what we think would be the much messier questions
associated with dramatically altering the types of cases within it.
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E. Strategic Increases
So far, we have contemplated that Congress could use our data
reactively to assess the size and composition impacts of a proposed
change. For any proposed increase to the amount in controversy
threshold, would the expected decrease in the size of the diversity
docket strike Congress as too small, too large, or just right? Would
the expected changes to the mix of cases and litigants strike
Congress as too high a price to pay, an acceptable side effect, or
possibly even a bonus?
But Congress could come at these questions from the other
direction. Congress could decide on a diversity profile and then use
the amount in controversy as a sculpting tool. For example, if
Congress decided it wanted to focus diversity jurisdiction on mass
torts, it could steer the diversity docket in that direction by making
escalating increases to the amount in controversy threshold. To be
sure, Congress could achieve that type of goal much more directly
and effectively by amending the diversity statute to include or
exclude particular categories of cases. But the point remains that as
Congress gains more information about the relationship between
the amount in controversy and the composition of the diversity
docket, it then becomes possible for Congress to use the amount
threshold as a proxy for changing the profile of cases in the
diversity docket. Our data suggests it would only be a loose proxy.
But it is not implausible that jurisdictional politics might lead
Congress in the direction of a loose proxy over an overt reform.
And further research might provide more refined data.
CONCLUSION
Increasing the amount in controversy in the diversity statute
will likely have complicated and multifaceted effects on the federal
litigation landscape. Setting any jurisdictional amount entails a
choice with differential impact on different types of cases, different
litigants, and different parts of the country. But choose we
must. The hope of this article is that such a choice is better
made against the backdrop of empirically informed doctrinal and
normative arguments.
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While this article has focused on federal diversity jurisdiction, it
is important to point out that most litigation occurs in state courts.175
Many states, similarly, distribute cases to different state courts,176
or to different tracks within those courts,177 based on amount in
controversy determinations. These states use jurisdictional
amounts to prioritize some litigants and some types of cases over
others. Some are afforded ample procedural opportunities and
well-funded courts; others receive summary adjudications, few
procedural protections, and courts that handle crushing caseloads.
We hope future researchers will build on the approach
pioneered in this article with iterative and improved work, not only
at the federal level, but also with an eye toward adjudications in
state and tribal courts.178

175. See generally Justin Weinstein-Tull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 VA. L. REV.
1031 (2020); Diego A. Zambrano, Federal Expansion and the Decay of State Courts, 86 U. CHI. L.
REV. 2101 (2019).
176. See, e.g., CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC., Art. 2, § 116.221 (“[T]he small claims court has
jurisdiction in an action brought by a natural person, if the amount of the demand does not
exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000).”); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 27.031 (“[T]he justice court has
original jurisdiction of [] civil matters in which exclusive jurisdiction is not in the district or
county court and in which the amount in controversy is not more than $20,000 . . . .); S.B.
6417, 2019 Leg., (N.Y. 1999)(Increasing small claims jurisdiction in New York City Civil Court
from $5,000 to $10,000. The jurisdictional limit for small claims would remain $5,000 for City
Courts outside of New York City, and $3,000 for Town and Village Courts.).
177. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 16.1 (providing “[s]implified [p]rocedure [for] civil
actions other than [] civil actions in which any one party seeks monetary judgment from any
other party of more than $100,000.”).
178. See, e.g., PAWNEE TRIBE OF OKLA., L. & ORD. CODE, Ch. 16, § 1601 (“The following
suits may be brought under the small claims procedure: [] Actions for the recovery of money
based on contract or tort, including subrogation claims, but excluding libel or slander, where
the amount sought to be recovered . . . does not exceed Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00).”);
L. OF THE CONFEDERATED SALISH & KOOTENAI TRIBES CODIFIED, Title IV, Ch. 4, § 4-4-102
(“[T]he Tribal Court sit[s] as the Small Claims Division of the Tribal Court in all actions for
money damages . . . when the amount claimed is not less than $50, nor more than $3000.”).
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